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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
USING INOCULATION MESSAGES TO 
 PROTECT “STAY IN THE MARKET” BELIEFS 
DURING FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
This paper focuses on the problem of collapsed “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs 
during financial crises.  The primary purpose of this investigation was to ascertain 
whether or not inoculation messages represent a viable communication strategy to 
preemptively protect SIM beliefs during forthcoming financial crises.  Ancillary purposes 
of this study were to further investigate the role of print and video crises, explicit 
instructions regarding post-inoculation talk (PIT), and gain and loss frame inoculation 
messages on the inoculation process.  This study used a between subjects factorial design 
(3 x 2 plus four additional conditions) to explore ten hypotheses.  Data collected from 
513 participants were analyzed using multivariate and univariate tests and planned 
comparisons.  The results of this investigation indicate that inoculation messages can 
serve as a viable preemptive crisis communication strategy, that inoculation can protect 
beliefs equally well when the crisis message is presented through video or print, and that 
employing a loss frame can strengthen the inoculation process.  Mixed results regarding 
PIT call for further research.  Research and practical implications, as well as limitations,  
are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 This paper joins the well-established inoculation theory scholarship (see Compton 
& Pfau, 2005) with a contextual focus on investor sell-offs amidst financial crisis. 
Specifically, this study addresses the ability of investor “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs 
to withstand market turbulence.  SIM beliefs can be defined as the underlying consistent 
belief of individual investors that market holdings should not be liquidated as an 
unplanned reaction to negative market events or overall market turbulence (Basu, Raj, & 
Tchalian, 2008; Hudomiet, Kezdi, & Willis, 2011).  This paper posits that messages 
based on inoculation theory offer an effective strategy for financial institutions to 
proactively manage future financial crises by providing investors with messages designed 
to protect existing SIM beliefs against persuasive attack. 
Inoculation messages create resistance to persuasion by offering two sides of a 
controversial topic in an attempt to reinforce an existing attitude, belief, opinion while 
lessening the impact of future persuasive attacks (Compton & Pfau, 2005).  Research has 
shown that inoculation theory functions by pointing to the vulnerability of a person’s 
existing belief (termed as threat), introducing possible oppositional viewpoints to that 
belief, and then providing refutational preemption (i.e., statements in support of the 
original belief designed to overwhelm the oppositional viewpoint) (Compton & Pfau, 
2005; Ivanov, 2011).   
While, as this paper argues, inoculation messages can offer an effective solution 
to the issue of collapsed SIM beliefs, four potential barriers to inoculation’s applied use 
are addressed:  a preference for no communication, preference for a bolstering strategy, a 
lack of understanding about how inoculation messages will function in absence of crisis, 
and a research gap concerning the impact of crisis communication medium.  
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Theoretically grounded hypotheses and experimental test methods are offered as a 
research-driven strategy for addressing and overcoming these barriers to applied use. 
In addition to the four barriers to inoculation’s applied use mentioned above, this 
study attempts to extend inoculation research by testing two theoretical concepts that 
could impact the application of inoculation theory to the context of SIM beliefs.  First, 
this study addresses the impact of post-inoculation talk (PIT) on the process of generating 
resistance to persuasion.  While inoculation was long considered an entirely sub-vocal 
process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005) recent research (Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012) has 
suggested that interpersonal conversations about the issue following the inoculation 
message can strengthen the generated resistance to persuasion.  The interpersonal 
conversations about the inoculation message are termed PIT in inoculation research.  
However, further research is needed to nuance the role of PIT in the inoculation process.  
Therefore, since PIT may strengthen resistance (Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012), this study 
will be the first to examine whether or not PIT can be artificially boosted by suggesting 
that participants discuss the issue as part of the inoculation message.  If the results of this 
study show that PIT can be artificially boosted, financial institutions that employ an 
inoculation strategy can also bolster their efforts by encouraging PIT and even providing 
investors a venue to connect with their peers. 
The second theoretical concept addressed in this study is the role of gain and loss 
message framing on the effectiveness of inoculation treatments, particularly with regard 
to the context of protecting SIM beliefs amidst financial crisis.  Prospect theory’s core 
concept, that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010), is 
integrated into inoculation messages designed to protect SIM beliefs.  The financial 
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content inherent in inoculation messages geared towards SIM belief protection offers a 
unique opportunity to emphasize either the potential for gain or loss.  If prospect theory is 
supported and loss-framed inoculation messages generate greater resistance, this finding 
will offer practitioners greater insight into the best way to use inoculation messages to 
protect SIM beliefs. 
In the proceeding sections, literature relating to SIM beliefs and the financial 
context, inoculation theory in general, inoculation theory in crisis communication, 
barriers to inoculation theory’s application, post-inoculation talk, and gain and loss 
message framing is reviewed.  Ten hypotheses relating to the areas of reviewed literature 
are offered, in addition to the proposed test method.  Results for each hypothesis and a 
corresponding discussion conclude this investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
SIM Beliefs 
As previously mentioned, “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs can be defined as the 
underlying consistent belief of individual investors that market holdings should not be 
liquidated as an emotional or irrational reaction to negative market events or overall 
market turbulence (Basu et al., 2008; Hudomiet et al., 2011).  Stated simply, SIM beliefs 
are an integral part of two common investing strategies, either a buy and hold or timing 
(i.e., buy low/sell high) approach (Hilliard & Hilliard, 2011).  Each of these strategies 
mandate that investors avoid selling securities during a market downturn (Hilliard & 
Hilliard, 2011).  SIM beliefs are established prior to financial crisis as an ideal strategy 
for sustaining financial crisis in a way that is most beneficial to an investment portfolio’s 
success (Hartmann, 2010).  Therefore, for SIM beliefs to exist, they must be established 
in anticipation of financial crises with the knowledge that those crises can result in a loss 
of portfolio value.  SIM beliefs’ prerequisite condition of thinking through possible 
negative market scenarios in relation to one’s portfolio by default means that SIM belief 
holders will often have a long investment time horizon (Zweig, 2008).   
SIM beliefs are typically socially constructed between a financial organization 
and its clients, who are investors in the financial markets (Hartmann, 2010; Vitt, 2004).  
Strong SIM beliefs are mutually beneficial for an investor and financial institution 
because a securities sell-off during a market turndown can create severe financial 
ramifications for both parties.  In addition, federal law requires that financial institutions 
inform investors about the possibility of a decline in asset values during market 
downturns (i.e., investment risk) prior to purchasing securities (Hartmann).  Since selling 
securities at the bottom of a market cycle is rarely a recommended investment practice, as 
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previously mentioned, SIM beliefs are an integral part of many investing scenarios (Vitt, 
2004; Weller, 2011).   
While understanding and protecting SIM beliefs is of vital importance, as this 
paper argues, a key distinction must be made.  Violation of SIM beliefs occurs when 
investors make irrational decisions to sell securities amidst poor market conditions (i.e., 
panic) to the detriment of the investor, financial institution, and possibly the financial 
market as a whole.  However, some investors must sell securities in less than optimal 
market conditions (i.e., financial crises) due to a variety of legitimate reasons.  For 
example, an investor might have a short time frame until retirement that prohibits further 
declines in asset value and thus necessitates selling securities and holding a cash 
portfolio.  Or, an investor might have major expenses that occur during a financial crisis 
that call for a conversion to cash regardless of recent market losses.  However, the 
improvement of sound decision making processes amidst financial crisis is outside the 
scope of this study.  This research concerns message strategies designed to prevent 
potential investor panic about market conditions that results in an irrational and harmful 
securities sell-off (i.e., a violation of SIM beliefs).   
If SIM beliefs are not present or are violated (i.e. securities are liquidated for 
irrational reasons), an investor can seriously hinder his or her portfolio’s ability to fully 
recover from a reduction in asset value resulting from a market downturn (Zweig, 2008).  
Violating SIM beliefs by selling securities and holding the portfolio in cash would not 
allow an investor to capitalize on subsequent market upswings that would provide an 
opportunity to regain diminished asset value (Weller, 2011).   
 In addition to harming an individual investor’s portfolio, an absence or violation 
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of SIM beliefs harms the financial interests of the organization facilitating the 
investments.  Retail brokerage institutions earn a majority of revenue based on a 
percentage of total client asset value (Cappon, Manuel, & Mignot, 2007). For example, if 
a client has $100,000 invested with Firm X, Firm X earns 1% of that value, or $1,000 per 
year.  If the client’s funds were reduced to $70,000 due to a market downturn, then, the 
financial institution would earn $700 rather than $1,000.   
This fee structure, dubbed as asset annuitization, is a departure from traditional 
models of revenue generation based on transaction fees per securities trade (Cappon et 
al., 2007).  The trend toward asset annuitization has made client SIM beliefs a major 
concern for the financial sector at the organization and industry level.  Simultaneous 
client sell-offs amidst market downturns can create a cycle of harm to the financial health 
of an organization since retail brokerage institutions typically generate revenue based on 
a percentage of total client securities holdings (Cappon et al., 2007).  Therefore, when 
market downturns reduce the value of those holdings, less revenue is generated.  This 
reduction in asset value due to a market downturn is exacerbated when clients sell 
securities and hold cash. The combination of these two events at high levels—overall 
reduced portfolio values and widespread security sell-offs—can threaten a financial 
organization’s stability.  If the organization is large enough, the negative ramifications 
created by the market downturn and resulting client securities sell-offs can cause a ripple 
effect through the entire financial sector, thus perpetuating the market downturn cycle 
(Rotheli, 2007). 
 Despite the importance of SIM beliefs for individual investors, financial 
institutions, and the financial sector as a whole, these beliefs are commonly threatened 
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and subsequently violated by investors (Basu, Raj, & Tchalian, 2008; Gounaris & Prout, 
2009; Ratajczak, 1999).  As previously mentioned, SIM beliefs are violated when 
investors make irrational decisions amidst turbulent market conditions or negative market 
happenings. A great deal of research offers that investors act in an irrational and affect-
based manner when faced with market downturns (Basu, et al., 2008; Dreman, 2004; 
Nofsinger, 2005; Peterson, 2007; Ratajczak, 1999).  Therefore, it is evident that existing 
SIM beliefs are in many cases not able to sustain financial crises.  For example, this 
fallibility of SIM beliefs was seen in the financial crisis of 2008-2010.  The market 
turbulence from 2008-2010 resulted in record levels of sidelined cash, or money held in 
cash to avoid market fluctuations (Bhaktavatsalam & Leondis, 2012).   
The propensity towards emotional and irrational security sell-off decisions during 
financial crisis leaves investors and financial institutions even more vulnerable to 
financial harm during a crisis period.  This risk of an irrational reaction to market events 
(i.e., a breakdown of SIM beliefs) is further enhanced by the competing messages that 
investors face during financial crises.  Research (Hester & Gibson, 2003; Stevenson, 
Gonzenbach, & David, 1994; Wu, Stevenson, Chen, & Guner, 2002) shows that media 
outlets favor negative news during economic and financial crisis.  For example, in an in-
depth analysis of the financial news of the 2001 financial crisis, Hester and Gibson found 
that media outlets not only reported negative news more prominently, but 
overwhelmingly framed negative news in a sensationalistic way.   
To help insulate investors, financial advisors, retail brokerage firms, and the 
financial industry as a whole from poor market conditions and coinciding bad market-
related press a pre-emptive strategy should be implemented to protect SIM beliefs.  Since 
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investors are often making irrational financial decisions amidst crisis, financial 
institutions have an opportunity to target investors with messages aimed to protect SIM 
beliefs.  Success of the protection messages would simultaneously prevent investors from 
making decisions that would result in financial harm and insulate financial institutions 
from the increased negative effects of client securities sell-offs during market downturns. 
This study is not the first to suggest that a pre-emptive crisis management strategy 
can help insulate organizations from forthcoming crises.  For example, in a recent 
conceptual work Kim (2013) suggested that “crisis communication is critical to a 
corporation’s long-term success” (p. 293) and that consumer response to crisis could be 
influenced with pre-crisis communication.  Kim went on to suggest that corporate 
advertising prior to crisis could have an inoculation effect by lessening the severity of 
post-crisis consumer response to negative news.   
Similar to Kim (2013), this paper also asserts that pre-emptive messages can 
influence crisis effects.  However, this work advances the proposition that messages 
actually designed on the principles of inoculation theory can offer protection to 
organizations during forthcoming crises.  More specifically, it is argued that inoculation 
messages offer an effective solution to the problem of SIM belief collapse during 
financial crisis.  This paper extends the conceptual suggestion (e.g., Kim, 2013) of an 
“inoculation effect” of corporate advertising by testing inoculation messages in crisis 
situations.  Inoculation theory is built on the concept of two-sided messages, or those that 
offer exposure to an opposing viewpoint as a way to foster resistance to persuasion 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005; McGuire, 1961; 1964).  Inoculation messages have shown 
consistent efficacy during the past five decades to protect attitudes, opinions, beliefs, 
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behavioral intentions, and values (henceforth only referred to as beliefs) against 
persuasive attacks (see Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton, 2013; Compton & Pfau, 2005).  
Therefore, a belief protection strategy built on inoculation theory offers a plausible 
solution to the problem of SIM belief collapses during financial crises.   
Inoculation Theory 
As stated earlier in this study, inoculation messages are designed to generate 
resistance to influence using two-sided messages (Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & 
Pfau, 2005). Inoculation theory was developed by social psychologist William McGuire 
in the 1960s in response to a lack of research on how to generate resistance to persuasion 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005).  McGuire (1961; 1964) referred to previous work (Lumsdaine 
& Janis, 1953) concerning war propaganda that suggested the use of two-sided messages, 
or those that acknowledged likely counterpropaganda, were more effective than one-
sided messages.  McGuire reasoned two-sided messages could also work to generate 
resistance to persuasion and developed inoculation theory based on that logic.  He 
surmised that a weakened dose of an oppositional message would induce threat-elicited 
motivation to generate defenses for effective counterarguing in an individual who would 
then counterargue in support of his or her beliefs.  The result, he posited, would be 
resistance to persuasion generated through the mechanisms of threat and counterarguing. 
McGuire tested his theory and found that inoculation could protect an individual’s initial 
beliefs from persuasive attack (1961; 1962; 1964). 
Since inoculation theory’s development, research has supported McGuire’s initial 
view that inoculation theory functions as a result of two core mechanisms: threat and 
counterarguing (Benoit, 1991; Compton & Pfau, 2005; Pfau et al., 1997).  The threat 
component of the inoculation message can be either explicit or implicit.  Threat is 
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explicitly manipulated in the inoculation message by overtly warning individuals of the 
vulnerability of the belief and indicating that likeminded peers have already succumbed 
to the belief challenges (Compton, 2009; Compton & Ivanov, 2012).  Threat is implicitly 
manipulated when the belief’s vulnerability is shown by rendering the belief to weakened 
counter-belief challenges in the inoculation message. 
After threat is used to show vulnerability of a person’s beliefs, he or she should be 
motivated to shore up defenses of the existing belief.  The refutational preemption 
component of the inoculation message—which presents counter-belief arguments and 
disputations of those arguments—beside additional motivation also offers material and 
guided practice for how to defend the established belief; namely by counterarguing 
oppositional arguments.  The combination of threat and the resulting process of 
counterarguing are the mechanisms that are responsible for inoculation’s efficacy in 
generating resistance to persuasion. 
Threat is considered the foundational element of inoculation theory, with some 
scholars arguing that “inoculation is impossible without threat” (Compton & Pfau, 2005, 
pp. 100-101).  Though the optimal level of threat that a message should elicit remains an 
unanswered question (Compton, 2009), the accepted message design format attempts to 
generate both explicit and implicit threat (Ivanov, 2011).  Threat is perceived as the 
catalyst of inoculation theory due to its ability to “trigger(s) people’s motivation to 
defend their beliefs” (Wan & Pfau, 2004, p. 305).  However, threat built into an 
inoculation message requires the partnership with refutational preemption to complete the 
inoculation process (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Pfau et al., 1997).  Refutational preemption 
is the act of raising opposing arguments to the person’s belief and then overwhelming 
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those arguments with support for the existing attitude.  McGuire (1964) initially 
introduced refutational preemption as a way to offer guided practice at counterarguing, in 
addition to providing specific evidence for the individual to use when constructing his or 
her own counterarguments.   
The vast amount of research on inoculation’s threat and counterarguing 
mechanisms has established a standard format for constructing inoculation messages 
(Ivanov, 2011).  Messages designed to create the optimal amount of resistance to 
persuasive attack should first use implicit and/or explicit threat to make the vulnerability 
of an existing belief salient.  Then the majority of the message should center on 
refutational preemption, or introducing counterarguments to the current belief and then 
overwhelming them with evidence in support of the belief.  A standard inoculation 
message typically ends with a call to action, or request for the person to maintain his or 
her belief amidst persuasive attacks (Ivanov, 2011). 
In addition to providing an in-depth explanation of inoculation’s core mechanisms 
and establishing a standard message design format, inoculation research has 
demonstrated a consistent ability to protect existing beliefs against persuasive attacks (see 
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005).  Not only has a general functionality been 
shown, but a vast amount of theoretical nuances and extensions have been identified.  For 
example, previous research has shown that the protection inoculation messages generate 
can withstand multiple attacks (Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009a), can protect against novel 
attacks, or those not explicitly addressed in the inoculation message (Banas & Rains, 
2010; McGuire 1961; 1962; Pfau 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), and recent research (Parker, 
Ivanov, & Compton, 2012) has shown that inoculation messages can protect beliefs about 
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related but separate issues.  Inoculation’s success has also been demonstrated in a variety 
of contexts, namely corporate advertising and public relations (Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 
1995; Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau, 1992; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & Wigley, 2007; Pfau & 
Wan, 2006), political campaigns (An & Pfau, 2004; Compton & Ivanov, 2013; Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), adolescent health campaigns 
(Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994), 
differences in cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker, Miller, & Pfau, 2012), 
interpersonal communication (Sutton, 2011), instructional/educational communication 
(Compton & Pfau, 2008), and crisis communication (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 
2010). 
Inoculation Theory and Crisis Communication 
Some key findings from the body of work on inoculation theory make it a 
particularly viable strategy for approaching crisis communication, and more specifically 
the protection of SIM beliefs amidst financial crisis.  The first is that inoculation can 
protect against novel counterarguments (Banas & Rains, 2010; Pfau, 1992; McGuire 
1961; 1962; Wan & Pfau, 2004).  Novel counterarguments are counterarguments 
included in a persuasive attack that were not specifically addressed in the preceding 
inoculation message (Pfau, 1992).  As Kim (2013) notes, organizations can “seldom 
predict what sort of negative press they will be forced to defend themselves against” (p. 
297). 
The ability to protect against attacks not explicitly mentioned in the refutational 
preemption component of the inoculation message makes room for practical utility since 
– as other authors have noted (Kim, 2013) – practitioners often do not know the details of 
the crisis situation, or attack, their organization will face.  The chance to employ threat 
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and refutational preemption without knowing the specific details of the attack in advance 
give inoculation messages great applied potential.  For example, a persuasive attack on 
investors’ SIM beliefs could come in the form of an overall market downturn, an explicit 
sell recommendation in mass media, or the witnessed sell actions of fellow investors.  
Novel counterargument findings in inoculation research make inoculation messages a 
strategy that would allow practitioners to use a single message to protect against these 
various types of messages that could potentially threaten SIM beliefs. 
 Another reason inoculation messages are a valuable strategy for crisis 
communication is their utility as a preemptive crisis communication strategy.  Traditional 
crisis communication approaches such as corporate apologia (Hearit, 2001), image 
restoration (Benoit, 1997), situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2007; 
Coombs & Holladay 2001; 2002), and renewal discourse (Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, & 
Sellnow, 2005; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2009; 2010) focus on the best way for 
organizations to communicate with stakeholders following a crisis.  However, inoculation 
messages are designed for use in anticipation of an opposing message to a currently held 
viewpoint (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Wigley & Pfau, 2010).   
This preemptive nature of inoculation messages makes them valuable to crisis 
communication, particularly in the context of protecting SIM beliefs.  Due to the cyclical 
nature of financial markets (Rotheli, 2007), financial institutions can expect to face 
repeated attacks on SIM beliefs.  A preemptive crisis communication strategy is needed 
for all organizations (Kim, 2013), but financial institutions are particularly vulnerable 
since perpetual financial crises can be anticipated (Rotheli, 2007).  To echo the words of 
seminal crisis communication authors Mitroff and Pearson (1993), “…it is no longer a 
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question of whether a major crisis will strike any organization, it is only a matter of 
when, which type and how" (p. 115).  Employing inoculation messages as a preemptive 
crisis communication strategy can offer financial institutions a much needed risk 
management approach to protect SIM beliefs. 
 In addition to the ability of inoculation messages to protect against novel 
counterarguments and their utility as a preemptive risk management strategy, a third 
reason inoculation messages are ideal as a way to protect SIM beliefs are recent findings 
(Ivanov et al., 2009a) that show inoculation’s ability to withstand multiple attacks.  As 
previously mentioned, financial institutions are not only certain to face an attack on SIM 
beliefs, but those attacks will be repeated due to the cyclical nature of financial markets 
(Rotheli, 2007).  Therefore, inoculation’s efficacy in protecting against multiple attacks 
can be extremely valuable to an organization likely to face perpetual crises. 
 The final aspect of inoculation messages that make them an ideal fit for use as a 
crisis communication strategy is the exact, theoretically grounded message design 
strategy established through decades of research on inoculation theory (Ivanov, 2011).  
Inoculation messages can be used by practitioners to add maximum value since a 
theoretically-grounded and experimentally tested message format is available as a guide 
(Ivanov, 2011). The presence of a prescribed message format lessens the probability of 
misinterpretation or misuse in the applied sphere. 
Barriers to Inoculation Theory’s Application 
This study addresses four potential barriers that could prevent inoculation’s 
widespread use as a crisis communication strategy: the choice to not communicate at all, 
the preference for supportive messages (one-sided messages that only express a 
viewpoint in support of the existing belief) over inoculation messages, a lack of 
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understanding about the effects of inoculation on existing positive sentiment if a crisis 
does not occur, and a lack of multimodal inoculation research that accurately simulates 
real-world threat to existing beliefs (Compton & Pfau, 2005).  The proceeding sections 
address these four barriers and offer hypotheses and a test method designed to remove 
these potential barriers to inoculation’s use through further theoretical testing.   
Preference for no communication. The first barrier to inoculation’s use in the 
applied sphere as addressed in this study is the choice of practitioners to not communicate 
at all.  The choice not to communicate in crisis can be made in the interest of keeping a 
low profile (DeRiemer & Baxter, 1986), or as a result of communication spending cuts 
during financial crisis.  Research suggests that cuts in communication spending often 
come early during periods of organizational financial stress (Picard, 2001; West, 2008).  
This could mean that organizations are eliminating a vital resource that could help them 
weather the crisis.  In the case of retail brokerage institutions seeking to protect SIM 
beliefs, avoiding crisis communication and a subsequent collapse of SIM beliefs could 
enhance the crisis’ negative effects.  Therefore, to facilitate widespread implementation 
of a crisis communication strategy based on inoculation theory, practitioners need to be 
assured that the cost of the communication with stakeholders via inoculation can result in 
the protection of SIM beliefs, especially as compared with not communicating at all. 
 An extant study that focused on inoculation’s efficacy in crisis communication 
compared inoculation messages to a no-message control group in an attempt to see which 
resulted in greater pro-organizational attitude following a direct attack on the 
organization’s reputation (Wigley & Pfau, 2010).  Wigley and Pfau found that 
participants exposed to inoculation messages rated the organization higher on six 
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dimensions of corporate reputation as compared to the control group.  The Wigley and 
Pfau findings, combined with other research outside of the crisis context that 
demonstrates inoculation’s superiority to a lack of communication (see Compton & Pfau, 
2005), indicates that inoculation messages should protect SIM beliefs better than no 
communication (and thus justify its costs of implementation).  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H1: Participants exposed to inoculation messages will report (a) higher SIM 
beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs following an attack message 
indicating crisis than participants in the no-message control group. 
Preference for a bolstering strategy.  While some practitioners may choose to 
not communicate at all during a crisis, others will likely choose a strategy that consists of 
supportive messages over one that consists of inoculation messages (Compton & Pfau, 
2005).  In contrast to inoculation’s focus on integrating opposing arguments, supportive 
messages are those that only contain material to reinforce or support the existing belief 
(Wan & Pfau, 2004).  Supportive strategies are often presented as a competing strategy 
for inoculation-based campaigns (Ivanov et al., 2009a).  Compton and Pfau argue that a 
supportive strategy is more widely embraced due to an enhanced comfort level and 
greater familiarity.  They offer that, “people tend to prefer [a supportive strategy] and are 
more inclined to use it to protect attitudes” (Compton & Pfau, p. 104).   
In addition to a greater familiarity with supportive messages, another major 
reason for not choosing an inoculation strategy might be perceived inherent risk.  An 
inoculation message strategy requires that practitioners make their organization’s 
perceived weaknesses readily apparent to its stakeholders.  When inoculation messages 
  17 
are used as a preemptive crisis communication strategy practitioners would be 
highlighting potential future industry-wide challenges. For example, when using 
inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs – which is the focus of this study – the 
inoculation message would foreshadow stock market downturns.  Addressing negative 
stakeholder events and coinciding concerns might deter practitioners from employing an 
inoculation-based campaign.  The sole positive focus of a supportive message strategy 
could be perceived as a safer way to prepare for future crises. 
Despite this increased comfort level with supportive messages, research that has 
compared the efficacy of supportive messages to inoculation messages in protecting 
existing beliefs (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009b; McGuire 
1961; 1962; McGuire & Papageogris 1961) has shown an inoculation strategy to be 
superior.  The inoculation literature upholds the claim that this superiority is due to a 
supportive messages’ effect of leaving the recipient overconfident in her or her belief, 
thus making the person susceptible to persuasive attack (McGuire, 1961; Wan & Pfau, 
2004). 
A parallel to the supportive message concept in inoculation literature is the 
concept of a bolstering strategy in the crisis communication literature (Wan & Pfau, 
2004).  Wan and Pfau suggest that supportive inoculation treatments and bolstering 
messages used in crisis communication “function in much the same manner” (p. 303).  
Bolstering occurs when organizations communicate “only the good deeds…to reinforce 
positive perception towards the firm” (Wan & Pfau, 2004, p. 303) prior to the onset of a 
crisis.  Bolstering has played a prominent role in the development of key crisis 
communication strategies such as Coombs (2007) and Holladay’s (2001; 2002) 
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situational crisis communication theory.   
Much like the preference for supportive messages noted by inoculation scholars 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005), bolstering is a preferred strategy in crisis communication (Wan 
& Pfau, 2004).  Wan and Pfau offer that the preference for bolstering among crisis 
communication scholars likely stems from the desire for “a positive organization-
stakeholder relationship and organizations’ past good performances help to reduce 
publics’ negative perception towards the company in the event of a crisis” (p. 303). 
Another reason for the preference of bolstering to handle crisis situations is the 
lack of research that has compared bolstering to an inoculation-based strategy.  To date 
only two studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) have explicitly compared a 
bolstering to inoculation approach in the crisis communication context.  Both of these 
studies indicated that an inoculation and supportive approach equally protected attitudes 
toward an organization following a crisis at a specific organization.  In 2004 Wan and 
Pfau hypothesized that while both supportive and inoculation treatments would confer 
resistance to persuasion, inoculation messages would protect attitudes better than 
supportive ones. They based their hypothesis on past research outside of the crisis 
communication context (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire & 
Papageogris 1961) that showed the superiority of inoculation messages to supportive 
messages.  Wan and Pfau tested their hypotheses in a three-phase experiment centering 
on a hypothetical gas explosion at a well-known petroleum refinery.  Attitudes about the 
company were measured to assess the effectiveness of the experimental conditions.  
However, despite the authors’ well-founded hypotheses, they found that supportive and 
inoculation strategies equally conferred resistance to persuasion.   
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Similarly, in 2010 Wigley and Pfau compared supportive and inoculation 
messages and the resulting attitudes about six dimensions corporate reputation following 
a well-known pet food company’s contamination crisis.  Like Wan and Pfau (2004), 
Wigley and Pfau found supportive and inoculation messages to equally confer resistance 
to persuasion. 
While both the of the studies (Wan and Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) that 
have explicitly compared supportive to inoculation messages in the crisis communication 
context have shown the two strategies to equally protect corporate attitudes, previous 
research outside the crisis communication context (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; Ivanov 
et al., 2009b; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire & Papageogris 1961) shows inoculation as 
a superior strategy to supportive, or bolstering, messages.  Some key differences between 
the current study and previous crisis communication findings (Wan & Pfau 2004; Wigley 
& Pfau 2010) suggest that, while the current study concerns crisis communication, 
inoculation messages should show superiority to supportive messages in a manner 
consistent with previous research outside the crisis communication context.  The 
similarities between this research and non-crisis inoculation research that has compared 
supportive and inoculation messages to protect general beliefs are outlined in the 
proceeding paragraph. 
Both Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010) explored how a crisis at a 
well-known company affected attitudes toward that company.  However, the current 
study focuses on SIM beliefs that exist independently of attitudes toward a specific 
financial institution.  This focus on the general belief rather than the actions of a specific 
organization is more in line with previous research (McGuire, 1964; 1962, McGuire & 
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Papageorgis, 1961) that has found inoculation to be a superior strategy to supportive 
messages.  For example, McGuire conducted his research program using general beliefs 
he deemed “cultural truisms” such as brushing one’s teeth and visiting the doctor 
regularly (1964).  When inoculation and supportive strategies were used to protect these 
beliefs from persuasive attack, inoculation messages showed superiority.  Due to the 
similarity with past research on protecting general beliefs, it is hypothesized that: 
H2: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will report (a) higher SIM 
beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs following an attack message 
than participants who are exposed to a supportive-only message. 
Inoculation messages in absence of crisis.  Another barrier to inoculation’s use 
as an organizational crisis communication strategy, in addition to preference for not 
communicating at all or using a supportive strategy, is the apprehension that inoculation 
messages will harm positive stakeholder sentiment if a crisis does not occur.  In the 
context of protecting SIM beliefs during crisis, the threat component of the inoculation 
message would stimulate counterarguing by highlighting the fact that other investors 
have panicked due to market fluctuations and stopped doing business with their 
organizations.  In addition, the refutational preemption component of the inoculation 
message would introduce possible oppositional viewpoints (e.g., securities may decline 
so far in value that they cannot recover) prior to providing evidence to overwhelm the 
oppositional viewpoint.  Such an expose' of SIM belief weaknesses is a source of 
discomfort, and thus a barrier to use, for any practitioner considering use of an 
inoculation strategy.  Though, in the context of retail investing, market downturns will 
inevitably occur (Rotheli, 2007), those downturns might not reach crisis level within 
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close proximity to the inoculation treatment. Thus, inoculation’s integration of 
oppositional viewpoints presents an inherent risk to SIM beliefs. 
 Both of the studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) that have 
conceptualized persuasive attacks as a crisis situation and studied inoculation as a 
stakeholder perception protection strategy have investigated this potential downside to 
inoculation’s use.  Wigley and Pfau (2010) compared inoculation and control groups and 
found that, when compared to no communication, inoculation treatments did not harm 
attitudes towards an organization in absence of a crisis.  In fact, Wigley and Pfau found 
that in some dimensions of corporate reputation (e.g., financial performance), inoculation 
treatments actually boosted attitudes.  Since inoculation has been shown to work equally 
well with attitudes and beliefs (Compton & Pfau, 2005), it is hypothesized that: 
H3: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will not report (a) lower SIM 
beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs in absence of an attack message 
compared to participants exposed to a control message. 
Like Wigley and Pfau (2010), Wan and Pfau (2004) also investigated a no-crisis 
condition.  However, Wan and Pfau compared inoculation messages to supportive ones 
rather than a control group (due to a lack of power) in absence of crisis.  Wan and Pfau’s 
findings indicated that, as compared to supportive messages, inoculation messages may 
not protect attitudes as well in absence of crisis.  In their study, supportive messages 
resulted in stronger pro-organizational attitudes than inoculation messages in absence of 
crisis.  Better performance in absence of a crisis could lead practitioners to use a 
supportive strategy rather than one based on inoculation.   
However, recent research regarding cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker, 
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Miller et al., 2012) indicates that the Wan and Pfau findings could be due to their use of 
Chinese participants.  Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. found that not only is culture a 
moderator of inoculation’s success, but that the collectivist mentality that predominates 
Asian cultures can weaken the effects of inoculation messages as compared with the 
effects of inoculation messages on members of an individualistic (e.g., American) 
culture.  A collectivist culture is one in which members engage in an “internally tense 
struggle to find equilibrium between the desire for ingroup assimilation and individuation 
from it” (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012, p. 6).  As a consequence of this collectivist 
mentality and the corresponding inclination towards equilibrium, members of collectivist 
cultures tend to evaluate both sides of a two-sided message equally even in cases such as 
inoculation messages where one side of the argument is presented as the stronger 
argument (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012).   
In Asian cultures the need for harmony may lead to a desire for balance within a 
two-sided message.  Therefore, the collectivist mentality can move members of Asian 
cultures to assign both sides of the argument presented in an inoculation message equal 
credence even though the evidence on one side of the argument is stronger.  Since 
inoculation messages are designed to protect existing beliefs, an equal weighting of the 
sides of the argument may move individuals toward the middle of the argument and away 
from their original belief or at the minimum fail to strengthen the existing belief.  Thus, a 
collectivist mentality may actually move inoculated individuals away from the advocated 
position.  Therefore, the Wan and Pfau (2004) findings that show performance of 
inoculation messages as less effective than supportive messages may be a product of 
cultural differences between Asian cultures and American culture (Ivanov, Parker, Miller 
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et al., 2012), the culture in which the majority of inoculation studies have been 
conducted. 
In contrast, individualistic cultures such as the United States should respond more 
favorably to unbalanced two-sided messages that have a clear strong and weak side to the 
argument (e.g., inoculation messages) (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012).  Individuals in 
individualistic cultures tend to evaluate the merits of both sides of an argument presented 
in an inoculation message without the slant towards equilibrium found in collectivist 
cultures (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012).  Therefore, when members of an 
individualistic culture are presented with an inoculation message they tend to recognize 
and accept the stronger position (i.e., the advocated message). 
The differences in American and Asian message processing are an important 
consideration when assessing the Wan and Pfau (2004) findings that show supportive 
messages protecting attitudes better than inoculation messages in absence of a crisis.  
Since Asian (i.e., collectivist) participants were used in the Wan and Pfau study, the 
Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. (2012) findings indicate that Wan and Pfau’s sample should 
have responded less favorably to a two-sided message strategy such as inoculation.  The 
Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. (2012) findings also support the great deal of research that 
shows inoculation message superiority to supportive message with use of American 
research participants (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire & 
Papageorgis 1961).  Therefore, when supportive and inoculation messages are compared 
in the absence of crisis using American research participants, inoculation messages 
should protect beliefs as well or better than supportive messages.  The explanation of the 
Wan and Pfau (2004) findings based on the research by Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. 
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(2012), together with the Wigley and Pfau (2010) findings that show inoculation does not 
harm attitudes in absence of crisis, support the following hypothesis: 
H4: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will not report (a) lower SIM 
beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs in absence of an attack message 
compared to participants exposed to a supportive message. 
Impact of crisis communication medium.  In addition to a lack of 
communication, a preference for supportive messages, and apprehension about 
inoculation’s effects in absence of crisis, the fourth barrier to inoculation’s use as a crisis 
communication strategy results from a gap in inoculation research.  Until this point 
inoculation research has largely treated communication medium “as a ‘neutral’ conduit of 
message content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195).  Because of this assumption the “overwhelming 
majority of inoculation studies have used print treatments” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195).  
However, based on a large body of work that asserts a major effect of the medium on the 
message (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro, 1984; McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan, 
1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987; Wiegman, 1989, Worchel, Andreoli, & 
Eason, 1975), this underlying assumption in inoculation research is likely overlooking a 
key factor.  The importance of understanding the impact of the communication medium 
on the message is even more pertinent in light of the current multi-faceted media 
landscape (Quandt & von Pape, 2010).  In the context of protecting SIM beliefs, it is a 
near certainty that investors will face an attack message through a variety of media forms 
(Vitt, 2004).  If practitioners develop a strategy based on research that has tested 
inoculation’s efficacy using a print attack and print inoculation treatment, it cannot be 
safely assumed that the findings will translate when SIM beliefs are attacked through 
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other, more interactive media. 
 At this point only one study (Pfau, Holbert, Zubric, Pasha, & Lin, 2000) has 
explicitly addressed communication medium’s potential as a relevant variable in 
inoculation theory.  Pfau et al. tested the impact of print versus video inoculation 
treatments and found them to equally confer resistance to persuasion.  However, while 
print and video inoculation treatments may equally generate threat and counterarguing, 
and thus resistance to persuasion, it is possible that a persuasive attack communicated 
through various media forms could affect the generated resistance differently.  Attack 
messages have varied in strength of impact due to other factors, such as source attributes 
(Miller et al., 2013; Pfau et al., 2000).  Since attack message variables have been shown 
to impact inoculation’s success, but have been less studied than inoculation message 
variables, presentation format of the attack message could change inoculation’s 
effectiveness.  Other studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Pfau, 
Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) have substituted inoculation or attack video treatments for 
the standard print format since communication medium has been assumed to have no 
impact.  Therefore, at this point no research has explicitly compared the impact of print 
and video attacks on inoculation’s ability to protect beliefs. 
 As previously mentioned, a large body of work contrasts inoculation theorists’ 
view of communication medium “as a ‘neutral’ conduit of message content” (Pfau, 1990, 
p. 195).  This body of work is collectively called medium theory (Meyrowitz, 1985; 
1994).  Medium theorists argue that a message’s impact is greatly affected by the 
medium through which it is communicated (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro, 
1984; McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan, 1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987; 
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Wiegman, 1989, Worchel, et al., 1975).  Medium theory posits that each communication 
medium carries a unique symbol system because it bears a history of the social and 
cultural change it created.  Leading medium theorist Meyrowitz (1994) offered: 
Most of the questions that engage media researchers and popular observers of the 
media focus only on…the content of media messages…medium theory examines 
such variables as the senses that are required to attend to the medium, whether the 
communication is bi-directional or uni-directional, how quickly messages can be 
disseminated, whether learning how to encode or decode in the medium is 
difficult or simple, how many people can attend to the same message at the same 
moment…such variables can influence medium’s use and its social, political, and 
psychological impact. (p. 50) 
 One intriguing aspect of medium theory as it relates to inoculation theory is the 
way it conceptualizes passive and active media forms.  In the scope of medium theory, 
multi-modal communication forms (i.e. those that engage multiple senses, such as 
television’s combination of audio and visual cues) are considered engaging due to the 
“simultaneity of action, perception, and reaction” (Meyrowitz, 1994, p. 57).  In contrast, 
according to medium theory uni-modal media forms such as print (that only requires 
reading) are considered flat.  These flat media forms are less engaging and thus more 
passive than multi-modal communication formats that require multi-sensory engagement. 
Christou (2009) offered: 
 Consider the book.  A book is a single-user, at-will experience, enabling frequent 
rereads of any individual piece of the content, within a relatively simple one-on-
one interaction and only requiring that the user have the ability to read.  
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Television, on the other hand, requires more effort on behalf of the viewer to 
understand and interpret meaning since it requires the more extensive use of 
visual and audio senses. (p. 7) 
 This conception of multi-modal communication forms as more active than a 
traditional print format is a departure from the dominant view.  Most mass media scholars 
(Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010) consider print a more active media form due to the 
cognitive processes required to read and process content.  In contrast to medium theorists, 
some mass media theorists would argue that multi-modal forms such as television can be 
consumed more passively than print since they do not require active cognitive processing 
such as reading (Biocca, 1988; Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010).  
 Though both conceptions of active and passive media forms – television as more 
active (Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994; McLuhan, 1967) and print as more active (Krugman, 
1965) – offer strong arguments, research in the inoculation context offers empirical 
evidence that supports medium theorists’ view of television as a more engaging and 
active media form than print.  As previously mentioned, some inoculation studies (An & 
Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) have 
substituted video inoculation and attack messages in the course of testing other concepts 
since communication medium has been considered “a ‘neutral’ conduit of message 
content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195).  Interestingly, when assessing the results of these studies 
retrospectively through the lens of medium theory, several of the findings support 
medium theory’s conception of video as a more active, engaging media form than print.   
 For example, Godbold and Pfau (2000) found that the resistance to persuasion 
generated by video inoculation messages did not withstand persuasive attack by a video 
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attack message.  Similarly, in the course of testing inoculation’s ability to generate 
resistance to persuasion contained in televised political debates, An and Pfau (2004) 
found that an overall demise in participatory spirit occurred when participants were 
inoculated with print treatments and presented with a video attack message.  In contrast, 
Nabi (2003) found strong results for inoculation’s effectiveness when she constructed a 
visually stimulating inoculation message rather than a typical “talking head” (p. 202) 
video format.  When presented with a video attack message, Nabi found that the 
resistance generated through the stimulating inoculation message was able to sustain 
persuasive attack.  Taken together, these three studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & 
Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) support medium theory’s conception of video as a more 
engaging media form than print.   
 In addition to the ancillary findings by Godbold and Pfau (2000), An and Pfau 
(2004), and Nabi (2003), Pfau and colleagues (2006; 2008) have explicitly studied the 
emotionally evocative power of visual images and inoculation’s impact on emotional 
response to images.  In 2006 (a), Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, and colleagues compared still 
images of war casualties to a text report of those casualties and found that still images 
had a greater ability to elicit negative feelings towards war.  When the researchers 
attempted to inoculate participants against the negative emotions elicited by visual 
images using a print treatment, inoculation showed very small effect sizes and only had 
an effect on women. 
 Similarly, in 2008 Pfau, Haigh, Shannon, and colleagues continued research on 
the evocative power of visuals by comparing televised news reports of war (i.e., featuring 
footage) and televised anchor reports of war.  Pfau et al. (2008) found that, when shown 
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war footage, participants reported higher issue involvement levels and less favorability 
towards the war effort than when they were shown an anchor report only.  More 
importantly, however, neither print only nor print with photograph inoculation treatments 
were able to generate resistance against an attack in the form of a video report with war 
footage.  Taken together, both of the Pfau et al. (2006; 2008) studies support medium 
theorists’ view that more sensory forms involved in a media form result in more audience 
engagement. 
 While the aforementioned studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; 
Nabi, 2003; Pfau et al. 2006; 2008) support medium theorists’ conception of television as 
a more engaging media form than print, they do not answer the question of whether or 
not more engagement will lead to more impact on the inoculation process.  However, 
previous research (Mazzocco, 2000; Mazzoco & Brock, 2006) indicates that consuming a 
combination of print and visual images requires more cognitive resources, which would 
leave less available resources for generating resistance (i.e., assessing threat and 
generating counterarguments).  Regarding the work of Mazzoco and colleagues, Ivanov 
et al. (2009a) offered, “[A] brief look at the cognitive resources models of how 
information is processed, stored, and retrieved, would indicate that processing both 
images and text may consume more resources than processing only images or text” (p. 
662). 
 The cognitive resources required to process print and text distracts individuals 
from the cognitive processes required to effectively receive an inoculation treatment.  
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kasmer, 
1988) distraction can impair an individual’s ability to process information.  Therefore, an 
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attack message featuring both images and spoken or written text can distract the 
individual from counterarguing, thus lowering his or her conferred resistance. 
 Since the medium through which a message is consumed should have a 
considerable impact on its meaning (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro, 1984; 
McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan, 1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987; Wiegman, 
1989, Worchel, et al., 1975), it is concerning that the media through which an attack 
media is presented has not been explicitly addressed in inoculation research.  The lack of 
understanding about how the attack communication medium will impact an inoculation 
message’s effectiveness represents a significant research gap.  In the context of SIM 
beliefs, investors are consuming various media forms.  If those media vary in their ability 
to overwhelm the protection created by a print inoculation message, it is an important 
consideration for practitioners using an inoculation strategy.  Therefore, in the first 
inoculation study to explicitly compare attack media forms, the following hypothesis is 
posited based on medium theory and previous inoculation research that has combined 
print and video formats and shown the strength of audiovisual media forms as compared 
to print: 
H5: Participants who receive an inoculation message then are exposed to a crisis 
message presented through video will report (a) lower SIM beliefs and (b) lower 
certainty in the SIM beliefs compared to participants exposed to a crisis message 
through print. 
Post-Inoculation Talk  
 In addition to the four relevant barriers to inoculation’s use – a preference for no 
communication, preference for a bolstering strategy, a lack of understanding about how 
inoculation messages will function in absence of crisis, and a research gap concerning the 
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impact of crisis communication medium – addressed in the preceding hypotheses, this 
study also seeks to understand the impact of post-inoculation talk (henceforth referred to 
as PIT) on the inoculation process.  Until recently inoculation theorists have considered 
inoculation to be a subvocal process and have therefore focused on internal processes and 
individual difference variables mediating intrapersonal communication (Compton & 
Pfau, 2009).  However, in 2009 Compton and Pfau argued that the unsettling nature of 
inoculation’s threat and refutation preemption components might motivate inoculated 
individuals to discuss the issue with others and thereby strengthen generated resistance. 
 The recent suggestion that inoculation might have interpersonal components in 
addition to the extensively studied intrapersonal processes such as threat and 
counterarguing (see Compton & Pfau, 2005) could have significant implications in the 
context of inoculating investors against SIM belief collapses during market turbulence.  
For example, Compton and Pfau (2009) suggested that not only could interpersonal 
conversations affect generated resistance, but that inoculation treatments could actually 
be spread through social networks.  While Compton and Pfau’s suggestion that 
inoculation treatments could spread through interpersonal conversation has not been 
explicitly addressed in inoculation research, Ivanov and colleagues (2012) found that PIT 
functioned as both reassurance for and advocacy of the inoculated individuals’ positions.  
They also posited that, “PIT might additionally function as a type of booster treatment” 
(Ivanov et al., 2012, p. 26).  If investors engage in PIT with other investors about keeping 
money in the market (i.e., maintaining SIM beliefs), those conversations might strengthen 
their own and others’ SIM beliefs. 
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 In the most extensive study on PIT, Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012) 
conducted research to assess the impact of PIT on generated resistance.  Ivanov, Miller et 
al. found that “…inoculation generates more talk, and talk contributes to resistance.  
Inoculated individuals are more likely to engage in the process of issue-related PIT more 
often and with more conversational partners compared to those not exposed to the 
inoculation message” (2012, pp. 16-17).  Ivanov et al. also found a positive relationship 
between generated threat, PIT (both frequency and amount), and resistance.  The findings 
of Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012) support Compton and Pfau’s (2009) argument 
that the vast amount of research that has focused on inoculation as an intrapersonal 
process may have overlooked the impact of interpersonal conversation about inoculation 
issues. 
 The recent findings unveiling the possibility of both vocal and subvocal 
components of the inoculation process (Ivanov et al., 2012; Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012) 
call for more research to identify the role each plays in conferring resistance.  For 
example, while Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012) found that vocal processes led to 
higher resistance, does that mean vocal counterarguing supplants subvocal (i.e., internal) 
processes?  If so, four decades of progress toward understanding how inoculation works 
is largely untenable.  Or, is internal, subvocal resistance merely enhanced by the vocal 
PIT process?  If this is the case, rather than supplanting existing research, more work 
regarding PIT can enhance what scholars already know about generating resistance 
through inoculation. 
 To begin the process of understanding vocal processes on inoculation, further 
work needs to attempt to isolate internal, subvocal processes and their effect on generated 
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resistance.  Examining the link between subvocal processes and generated resistance can 
help clarify the large body of work that suggests the ability of subvocal inoculation 
processes to generate resistance.  This study will attempt to isolate subvocal inoculation 
processes by providing participants an inoculation message that, at the end, asks them not 
to engage in PIT between experimental phases.   
 Though this study does ask participants to not talk about the issue between 
experimental phases, the inoculation message format will not be substantially different 
from messages used in other inoculation studies (Ivanov, 2011).  The request to not 
engage in PIT will only be one sentence at the end of the inoculation message.  Given the 
great number of instances of similarly formatted inoculation messages (see Compton & 
Pfau, 2005) in generating resistance to persuasion, merely asking participants to refrain 
from talking to others about their SIM beliefs should not nullify the inoculation-generated 
resistance.  Therefore, this study hypothesizes that:  
H6: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they not engage in 
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs 
compared to participants in the control condition. 
 As hypothesized above, the internal process previously thought to be wholly 
responsible for inoculation’s ability to generate resistance should still offer some 
resistance.  However, as previously mentioned, recent findings Ivanov et al. (2012) 
indicate a link between PIT and strengthened resistance.  Therefore, participants who 
engage in PIT should report more resistance than those who engage solely in subvocal 
process.  Since participants in the Ivanov et al. (2012) study reported PIT following a 
standard inoculation message, this study hypothesizes that: 
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H7: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they not engage in 
PIT will report (a) lower SIM beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs 
compared to participants exposed to the same inoculation message without 
mention of PIT. 
  Since research (Ivanov et al., 2012, Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012) has shown that 
PIT leads to greater resistance, a valuable avenue for future research is to determine 
whether or not PIT can be artificially boosted.  If an inoculation message that concludes 
with a request for individuals to discuss the issue as much as possible can boost PIT and 
thereby resistance, this finding can strengthen the inoculation efforts of financial 
institutions using an inoculation strategy to protect SIM beliefs.  Since previous research 
has shown a link between PIT and enhanced resistance, it is hypothesized that: 
H8: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they engage in 
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs 
compared to participants exposed to same inoculation message without mention 
of PIT.  
H9: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they engage in 
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs 
compared to participants exposed to same inoculation message asking that they 
not engage in PIT.  
Gain and Loss Frame Inoculation Messages 
 Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal article on Prospect Theory (PT), 
the findings that “losses loom larger than gains” (Rick, 2010, p. 454) have been repeated 
robustly in a variety of contexts.  PT offers that individuals will not always make 
decisions in a rational manner, and that the way a decision choice is presented (i.e., 
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framed as a potential gain or as a potential loss) can promote or reduce risk aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010).  Specifically, PT has shown over time that 
emphasizing potential losses can lead individuals to display enhanced risk aversion.  
Regarding the way PT influences decision making under risk, Rick (2010) offers that “In 
risky contexts, loss aversion can help to explain widespread risk aversion” (p. 454).  
 To date PT has not been studied alongside inoculation theory, despite the 
potential of enhancing inoculation’s effects in risk-based contexts through gain and loss 
message framing.  However, three inoculation studies have explored similar concepts.  In 
2010 Bizer, Larsen, and Petty tested valence framing in the context of political decision 
making.  Bizer et al. found that “framing a person’s attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a 
rejected position such as anti-Democrat) led to more resistance…than did framing the 
same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro-Republican)” (p. 
59).  However, the political context of Bizer et al.’s study disallowed two prerequisites of 
PT:  a risk-oriented context and a clear gain and loss scenario.  Therefore, Bizer et al.’s 
findings cannot be considered a demonstration of PT as it relates to inoculation theory. 
 Similarly, in a 2011 unpublished study Mason and Miller assessed the effect of 
positive-outcome and negative-outcome focused inoculation messages regarding goal-
oriented healthy food choices.  The authors found that: 
Compared to both control and positive outcome focus, participants who received a 
negative outcome-focused inoculation treatment were found to hold more 
negative attitudes toward the attacking source, perceived greater levels of threat, 
and generated elevated levels of counterarguments. Messages which employed 
negative outcome focus motivated participants to engage in a state of vigilance in 
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anticipation of an expected counter-attitudinal attack (threat) and were able to 
confer the most resistance. (Mason & Miller, 2011, p. 32) 
In 2009, as part of larger study on the role of affect in inoculation, Pfau and 
colleagues also found that a negative message frame enhanced the inoculation process.  
However, the Pfau et al. (2009) study was more similar to PT’s focus on gain and loss 
message framing than the two previously mentioned studies (Bizer et al., 2010; Mason & 
Miller, 2011) that also explored negatively framed inoculation messages.  Pfau and 
colleagues examined affective-positive (i.e., happy) inoculation messages and affective-
negative (i.e., angry) inoculation messages.  Consistent with previous affect-based 
inoculation research (e.g., Pfau et al., 2001), Pfau et al. (2009) conceptualized affect-
eliciting messages as those that centered on goal attainment.  Pfau and colleagues (2009) 
relied on the logic supporting Lazarus’ Appraisal Theory that states, “goal attainment or 
obstruction is key to the appraisal process and to elicited affect” (p. 80).  Pfau et al. 
further posited that, “[A]ffect triggers signal that goals may be facilitated (affective 
positive messages) or thwarted (affective negative messages)” (p. 78).  Pfau et al. used 
statistically and research-based evidence, but framed the evidence in terms of goals to 
represent an affect-based message.  Therefore, the positive and negative message framing 
used by Pfau et al. (2009) was similar to PT’s gain and loss message framing in that the 
messages used by Pfau and colleagues hinged on goal attainment.  Though the affective-
negative messages did not generate higher levels of resistance as an outcome, the results 
did indicate that the affective-negative messages impacted the process of resistance (Pfau 
et al., 2009).  Participants in the affective-negative condition reported higher levels of 
counterarguing than those in the affective-positive condition.   
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Thus, all three studies that have explored negative message framing in tandem 
with inoculation – Bizer et al. (2010), Mason and Miller (2011), and Pfau et al. (2009) – 
have shown the strength of negative message framing.  While these studies do not 
directly address financial loss framing, which is a direct application of PT in its original 
form, they do indicate that negative message framing is more impactful than positive 
message framing.  Findings related to this very similar concept (i.e., negative message 
framing) can be taken as a strong indication that PT related to financial losses and gains 
should replicate in the context of inoculating against SIM belief collapses. 
 The long history of findings in support of PT (see Rick, 2010) has significant 
implications for the present study on the role of inoculation messages in protecting SIM 
beliefs.  SIM beliefs and the crisis scenarios that could challenge SIM beliefs present an 
ideal risk-laden and financial-oriented context for use of gain and loss frame messaging.  
In addition, participants can easily understand gain and loss frame messages relating to 
selling securities during a market downturn.  Thus, inoculation message designed to elicit 
threat to SIM beliefs have a valuable opportunity to employ either a gain or loss frame.  
Per PT, inoculation messages employing a loss frame (i.e., emphasizing that funds could 
be lost by selling securities during a market downturn) should enhance risk aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010). In this context, the enhancement of risk 
aversion is a reduced SIM belief because staying in the market during a downturn is 
unpredictable while selling securities yields a known amount of cash and prevents further 
losses.  In contrast, per PT inoculation messages employing a gain frame (i.e., 
emphasizing that funds can be gained by keeping money in the market in anticipation of a 
market upturn) should reduce risk aversion.  In this context reduced risk aversion means 
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stable or increased SIM beliefs since to stay in the market during a downturn means 
greater acceptance of uncertainty about market movements (i.e., risk).  Therefore, based 
on PT it is hypothesized that: 
H10: Participants exposed to loss framed inoculation messages will report (a) 
higher SIM beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs compared to 
participants exposed to gain framed inoculation messages. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
 This investigation employed a 3 (experimental message: inoculation/supportive/ 
control) x 2 (crisis/no crisis) between subjects factorial design.  Four additional 
conditions were also added.  Two conditions assessed the impact of PIT (PIT/no PIT).  
These conditions each consisted of an additional sentence at the end of the standard 
inoculation message.  The “PIT” message instructed participants to discuss the issue with 
as many people as possible while the “no PIT” message instructed participants to discuss 
the issue of SIM beliefs with no one (see “Message Construction” section for further 
details). One condition was added to compare a gain frame inoculation message to the 
primary inoculation message that was designed as a loss frame message, and a video 
crisis condition was added to compare the effects of print and video attacks on 
inoculation’s effectiveness.   
Message Construction 
Inoculation and supportive messages.  This study employed a total of four print 
inoculation messages: the primary inoculation message (employing a loss frame), a gain 
frame inoculation message, an inoculation message that explicitly asked participants to 
engage in PIT (PIT), and a message that explicitly asked participants not to participate in 
PIT (no PIT). One supportive message was used in this study. 
 Each of the inoculation messages began with a paragraph designed to elicit threat 
in the participant through an explicit forewarning of an impending attack on beliefs.  Due 
to the importance of threat in the inoculation process (Compton, 2009; Compton & Pfau, 
2005), inoculation messages typically begin with threat activation (Ivanov, 2011).  
Therefore, the threat component of the messages was manipulated and tested in a pilot 
study to assess its effectiveness in generating threat.  An independent sample t-test 
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indicated that, though not statistically significant, the inoculation message (M = 3.65, SD 
= 1.35, n = 27) did generate higher threat levels than the supportive message (M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.64, n = 28).  Following the pilot study the inoculation message was slightly 
altered to serve two purposes: to enhance the threatening language and to ensure message 
equivalence with the other messages used in this study (see description of message 
equivalency procedures later in this section). 
 The second and third paragraphs were designed to support the opposition to the 
SIM belief and then refute each of those oppositional statements.  To test the gain and 
loss frame inoculation messages, the refutational preemption component of the message 
was designed to overwhelm the oppositional argument with either an emphasis on the 
money that could be made by staying in the market (gain frame) or the money that could 
be lost by violating SIM beliefs and selling off (loss frame).  The PIT-related messages 
ended with a sentence either asking participants to engage in PIT or asking them to not 
engage in PIT.  The supportive message consisted only of material designed to 
strengthen, or bolster, existing SIM beliefs. 
 Pursuant to previous inoculation research that recognizes the importance of 
language in message outcome variables (Wan & Pfau, 2004), message equivalency for 
the supportive and inoculation treatments was calculated using Becker, Bavelas, and 
Braden’s (1961) index of contingency.  This index accounts for the total message length, 
average paragraph length, and number of nouns to “assess the comprehensibility of 
messages” (Wan & Pfau, p. 312).  Messages receiving similar index scores indicate 
equivalence.  The messages used in this investigation received the following index 
scores:  inoculation loss frame – 9.5, inoculation gain frame – 9.2, and supportive – 10.0.  
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The index scores of these messages indicate relative equivalence.  Identical font size and 
layout was also used for each of the messages.   
Attack messages.  This study tested two attack message formats.  The same 
content was presented as video and as print to maintain consistency among participants in 
each condition.  Similar to Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010), the attack 
message in this study was a report of a crisis situation. However, unlike the other two 
studies that have used inoculation in a crisis communication context (Wan & Pfau, 2004; 
Wigley & Pfau, 2010), the crisis message in this study did not focus on events at a certain 
organization.  Rather, the crisis that served as the attack message in this study was a 
report of a major market downturn and coinciding widespread sell-offs.   
 In addition to a crisis and no-crisis condition, this study also attempted to 
understand how print and video attack messages vary inoculation’s effectiveness.  
Therefore, both the print and video crisis condition appeared to come from a widely 
known, politically neutral news organization (CNN) that features both print and broadcast 
outlets.  A visually engaging video broadcast news story, consistent with the work of 
Pfau and colleagues (2008) that showed the effectiveness of issue-related footage, was 
chosen.  The video did not mention a specific company or market event but instead 
focused on widespread stock market sell-offs.  Then, a print version of the video news 
story was created using similar language and aesthetics.   
 Due to the exploratory nature of video attack messages in inoculation research, 
the video attack message used in this study was pre-tested in a pilot study for its ability to 
threaten SIM beliefs.  In a control group that received neither a supportive nor 
inoculation message, belief levels and belief certainty were captured before and after 
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viewing the video attack message.  A paired sample t-test indicated that SIM beliefs were 
significantly lower for participants after viewing the video attack message than before (M 
= -.86, SD = 1.4, n = 52, t = -4.42, p < .01).  The certainty level of the beliefs also 
decreased significantly following the video attack (M = -80.1, SD = 22.85, n = 52, t = -
25.27, p < .01). 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the research system at the University of 
Kentucky that consists of undergraduate (primarily first year) communication students in 
required communication general education courses.  All participants were randomly 
assigned to the experimental conditions in the study. 
While the use of college students was a convenience sample, presumed student 
lack of investing experience is a major benefit to the validity of the study results.  A 
number of actual investors presumably experienced a loss of funds due to the turbulence 
in the financial markets in 2008-2010 (Craig, McCracken, Lucchetti, & Kelly, 2008).  
People who actually lost money would not have the ability to objectively process 
financial crisis reports, which would skew the findings of this study.  
Therefore, since this study was the first time several of the hypotheses were tested 
in an experimental setting, participants needed to be as similar with regard to investing 
experience as possible.  As such, college age participants were mature enough to see the 
value in adopting SIM beliefs but lacked a great deal of direct investing experience.  In 
phase one of this investigation investing experience was measured on a one to seven scale 
where one indicated “no experience” and seven indicated “a lot of experience” to confirm 
lack of investing experience.  The mean investing experience score for all of the 
participants in this study was 1.88.  For these reasons college students offered an 
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exemplar population for this study.  This investigation generated a sample size of 513 
participants.  The sample size yielded over 50 participants per cell in the ten cell design 
(3 [inoculation/supportive/control] x 2 [crisis/no crisis] + 4 [PIT/noPIT/video crisis/gain 
frame inoculation]).  The average sample per cell size for inoculation studies ranges from 
20-40 participants (see Banas & Rains, 2010).  Therefore, this study had an above 
average number of participants per cell. 
Procedures  
 The data collection for this study required three phases.  All data were collected 
online using Qualtrics survey software during the spring 2013 semester.  Online data 
collection was used in this study to boost attrition rates.  The ease of data collection and 
organization was also increased with an online format, similar to past inoculation 
research (Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012). 
 Participants could begin phase one at any point from the beginning of the spring 
2013 semester until six weeks before the end of the semester.  The enrollment of new 
participants was cut off six weeks prior to the end of the semester so that participants 
would have time to complete all three phases of the study, which were separated by two 
weeks (description to follow).  During phase one participants were exposed to material 
designed to generate SIM beliefs by emphasizing all of the financial benefits of a buy and 
hold, long-term investment strategy.  Participants then reported SIM belief level and 
certainty.  In addition to reporting SIM beliefs and certainty, participants in phase one 
also completed two measures designed to capture variables that served as covariates in 
this investigation:  initial involvement level and risk aversion propensity.   
 Access to phase two was provided to participants two weeks after completion of 
phase one.  During phase two, participants either received an inoculation message 
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(primary [loss frame], gain frame, PIT, or no PIT), a supportive message, or were 
assigned to the no message control group.  Following the inoculation, supportive, or no 
message administration, a threat manipulation check was performed across all conditions.   
 Access to phase three was provided to participants two weeks after completion of 
phase two.  Participants either randomly received an attack message in the form of a print 
or video crisis or did not receive an attack message at all (no crisis scenario).  Following 
the crisis condition (or lack thereof for the no-crisis control group), participants were 
again asked to report their SIM belief level and certainty.  Counterarguing output was 
captured during the final phase as well.   
Independent Variables  
Experimental condition.  The inoculation, supportive, and control conditions 
were manipulated during phase two as previously described.  To maintain consistency 
among the experimental conditions the inoculation, control, and supportive messages 
were presented as print.  However, unlike the print attack condition that was an online 
news story, the supportive and inoculation conditions were presented as plain text.  Two 
of the ten groups did not receive a message (controls), two of the ten treatment groups 
received a supportive message, and the remaining six treatment groups received an 
inoculation message.  Of the six inoculation treatment groups, three received the primary 
(loss frame) inoculation message, one received the gain frame inoculation message, one 
received the inoculation message with explicit instructions to engage in PIT, and one 
received the inoculation message with explicit instructions to not engage in PIT.  
Crisis scenario.  Hypotheses three and four were designed to understand the 
effects of various treatment messages (i.e., inoculation, supportive, and control) in 
absence of a crisis.  Therefore, not all participants received a crisis scenario in phase 
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three.  Additionally, for the primary (loss frame) inoculation message, a portion of the 
participants received a video crisis rather than a print crisis.  In phase three, of 
participants who received a supportive treatment or no treatment control, half received a 
print crisis and the other half did not receive a crisis.  For the participants who received 
the primary (loss frame) inoculation message, one third did not receive a crisis, one third 
received a print crisis, and one third received a video crisis.  The gain frame, PIT, and no 
PIT inoculation message conditions received print crisis messages only. 
Manipulation Check Variables 
Threat.  Since inoculation treatments should generate threat (Compton & Pfau, 
2005), manipulated threat was assessed for the inoculation, supportive, and control 
treatment groups (i.e., all participants) following their assigned treatment condition 
during phase two.  A measure consisting of five bipolar adjective pairs (i.e., 
nonthreatening/threatening, unintimidating/intimidating, not harmful/harmful, 
safe/dangerous, not risky/risky) situated along a seven-point semantic differential scale 
used in other inoculation studies (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau, 1992) 
was employed.  The threat scale used in this study has shown reliability in past 
inoculation studies (Compton & Ivanov, 2012 [α = .96]; Pfau et al., 2005 [α = .96]; Pfau 
et al., 2010 [α = .94]).  Additionally, a recent confirmatory factor analysis conducted by 
Compton and Ivanov (2012) demonstrated the measure’s validity.  The level of reliability 
in the current investigation was α = .81. 
Counterarguing output.  Consistent with McGuire’s (1961; 1962; 1964) original 
research on inoculation theory, counterarguing is still considered a key mechanism of the 
inoculation process (Compton & Pfau, 2005).  Threat should motivate participants to 
generate counterarguments, and refutational preemption should offer substance and 
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practice for counterarguing during the process of generating resistance.  For this reason, 
counterarguing output was captured for participants exposed to an attack message at the 
end of phase three.    
 Counterarguing was assessed using a check-off procedure employed in past 
inoculation studies (see Banas & Bessarabova, 2009; Ivanov, Parker, & Dillingham, 
2012).  The check-off procedure consisted of asking participants to review 12 arguments 
that reflected major arguments for and against staying in the market during a downturn.  
Participants were asked to examine the list of 12 arguments and check off arguments they 
thought of when considering whether or not to sell stock when the market is down.  
Participants were also asked to rate the strength of each argument they checked off on a 
one (weak) to seven (strong) scale.   
Covariates  
Involvement level.  Previous findings (Pfau, 1992; 1997; Pfau et al., 2004) on 
issue involvement indicate that the level of involvement a participant has with the topic 
influences the level of resistance created by an inoculation treatment.  By controlling for 
this variable, it was possible to further isolate the impact of the experimental conditions. 
Initial involvement level was captured at the end of phase one using an 
abbreviated version of Zaichowsky’s (1985) Personal Involvement Inventory (PII) used 
in other inoculation studies (Pfau et al., 2005).  Eroglu and Machleit (1988) introduced 
this version of the scale and since that time it shown reliability scores ranging from α = 
.87 to α = 96 (see Ivanov et al., 2009a).  The reliability level in the current study was α = 
.97.  The abbreviated version of the PII includes seven bi-polar adjective pairs:  
unimportant/important, irrelevant/relevant, non-essential/essential, of no concern/of 
concern to me, does not matter/matters to me, useless/useful, and trivial/fundamental. 
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Risk propensity.  A great deal of research (see Ho, 2009) indicates that a 
person’s risk tolerance and coinciding propensity for risk taking or risk aversion play a 
major role in the financial decisions he or she makes.  Since this study concerns SIM 
beliefs related to money invested in financial markets, propensity towards risk was 
considered a covariate. 
Risk aversion propensity was captured at the end of phase one using Hung and 
Tangpong’s (2010) uni-dimensional General Risk Propensity Scale.  This five item scale 
consists of the following items:  “I like to take chances, although I may fail”; “Although a 
new thing has a high promise of reward, I do not want to be the first one who tries it”; “I 
would rather wait until it has been tested and proven before I try it”; “When I have to 
make a decision for which the consequence is not  clear, I like to go with the safer option 
although it may yield limited rewards”; “I like to try new things, knowing well that some 
of them will disappoint me”; “To earn greater rewards, I am willing to take higher risks”.  
The General Risk Propensity Scale has shown a reliability of α = .71 - .73.  An 
independent sample confirmatory factor analysis also confirmed the validity of the 
General Risk Propensity Scale (Hung & Tangpong, 2010). 
However, when insufficient reliability of the General Risk Propensity Scale 
(Hung & Tangpong, 2010) was evident in this investigation an exploratory factor analysis 
was performed.  The requirement of sufficient sample size was met (e.g., 5-20 cases per 
parameter estimate; or 1-14 ratio) as 398 cases divided by five parameter estimates is just 
over 77 cases per estimate.  Because Maximum Likelihood extraction requires the 
measured variables to be normally distributed and without severe problems (i.e., |skew| > 
2, kurtosis > 7), the distributions of all five items were examined and the absolute skew 
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values ranged from .68 to -.18 and the kurtosis ranged from .19 to .99.  The Varimax 
method of rotation with Kaiser Normalization was used.  Based on a 60/40 load test two 
factors were present and three of the items loaded together.  Those three scale items were 
included in this investigation and the reliability after deletion of the other two items was 
α = .78. 
Prior investing experience.  Participants’ level of prior investing experience 
could impact the results of this investigation.  Participants with a great deal of investing 
experience may not interpret the financial crisis, inoculation, or supportive messages in 
the same way as participants with little or no investing experience.  Therefore, prior 
investing experience was considered a covariate in this investigation.   
To assess participants’ prior investing experience participants rated their own 
level of investing experience at the end of phase one.  Participants were presented with a 
one-item seven point semantic differential scale ranging from “no experience” to “a lot of 
experience”.   The directions for this measure read, “Please rate your level of experience 
with investing in the stock market.” 
Dependent Variables and Measures 
SIM beliefs.  SIM beliefs constituted the main dependent variable of this study.  
The level of SIM beliefs was assessed for all participants during phases one and three 
using McCroskey and Richmond’s (1996) six-item Generalized Belief Measure.  The 
GBM has a high reported reliability (range: α = .94 - .97) and has been used consistently 
to measure very specific beliefs (McCroskey, 2006).  The level of reliability generated in 
the current study was α = .98 in phase one and α = .99 in phase three.  Contexts of the 
GBM’s use include organizational, instructional, political, and interpersonal 
communication (McCroskey, 2006).  The GBM operates by stating the belief to be 
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measured (e.g., “People should sell their stock when the market is down”) and then 
offering five bipolar adjective pairs (I agree/I disagree, yes/no, false/true, right/wrong, 
incorrect/correct) situated along a seven-point semantic differential response scale.   
Belief certainty. In addition to the use of McCroskey and Richmond’s (1996) 
GBM to ascertain belief presence, belief certainty was also measured using a 1-100 point 
scale.  Participants were asked to complete the scale by estimating how certain they were 
about their belief toward the issue in question.  Zero indicated ‘‘no certainty’’ and 100 
indicated “absolute certainty” (Pfau et al., 2005).   
During the analysis portion of this investigation index change scores were 
calculated to measure changes in SIM beliefs and belief certainty.  To control for the 
initial phase one beliefs and certainty while capturing the inoculation-induced changes, 
the final phase three beliefs and certainty were subtracted from the initial beliefs and 
certainty captured in phase one.  The resulting index change values for each group were 
used as the dependent variables in this analysis.  An index value of zero represents no 
change while a positive change indicates strengthening and a negative change indicates 
weakening of SIM beliefs and belief certainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014 
 
  50 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Statistical Analyses 
 Multiple strategies were used to analyze the data in this study.  For the sake of 
parsimony, the hypotheses in this study were grouped into five sections and thus the data 
analyses were conducted in five sections.  Hence the results are presented in five parts 
following the omnibus and preliminary analyses results. The first section of analyses 
addressed hypotheses one and two, the second section addressed hypotheses three and 
four, the third section addressed hypothesis five, the fourth section addressed hypotheses 
six through nine, and the fifth section of analyses addressed hypothesis ten.  The 
dependent variables in each analysis were the level and certainty of the participant’s SIM 
beliefs following the randomly assigned treatment and attack messages (or lack thereof 
for the control and no crisis conditions).  As explained in the methods section of this 
study, the index change scores between phase one and three beliefs and belief certainty 
were used to represent the dependent variables.  
 The first section of the analyses employed a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance 
MANCOVA to determine if SIM belief or belief certainty differences existed among the 
inoculation, supportive, and control conditions for participants exposed to a persuasive 
attack.  This omnibus test addressed hypotheses one and two. 
The second analysis section was intended to discover differences among 
inoculation, supportive, and control conditions for participants who were not exposed to a 
crisis message.  This analysis addressed hypotheses three and four.  The participant’s 
initial involvement level and his or her risk propensity were used as covariates in the 
MANCOVAs for sections one and two to control for their influence on the dependent 
variables.  The multivariate tests were followed by univariate tests and – to further 
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explore significant differences – planned comparisons using Dunn’s multiple comparison 
procedure (see Kirk, 1995) were conducted on predicted outcomes. 
 The third section of analyses employed an independent samples t-test.  The 
purpose of the t-test was to determine whether or not inoculated participants’ SIM belief 
levels were impacted differently when a crisis situation was presented through video 
versus print.   
 Similar to the first and second sections, the fourth section of analyses employed 
multivariate analysis followed by univariate tests and planned comparisons.  Specifically, 
prior to the univariate and planned comparison tests a 2 (inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no 
PIT) MANCOVA was conducted.  The purpose of this test was to determine whether or 
not explicitly instructing participants regarding PIT would impact their SIM belief 
protection more than traditional inoculation messages.  The initial involvement level and 
risk propensity of participants were considered once again as covariates. 
 Finally, the fifth section of the analyses employed an independent samples t-test.  
The t-test was used to ascertain whether or not gain or loss frame inoculation messages 
equally protected SIM beliefs when participants were exposed to a persuasive attack. 
 This report will first address the manipulation check results.  The three 
multivariate and corresponding univariate results for the significant variables will follow 
the manipulation check results. A sequential presentation of the ten hypotheses and the 
planned comparisons used to assess the hypotheses will conclude the results portion of 
this investigation.  However, prior to addressing the analyses it is relevant to note that 
investing experience was omitted as a covariate due to the very low variation – namely a 
lack of investing experience – reported by participants. 
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Manipulation Checks 
The first manipulation check in this study was assessed on the level of threat 
generated by the treatment message in phase two.  Threat is an integral component of the 
inoculation process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005).  Therefore individuals who received an 
inoculation (M = 4.50, SD = 1.52, n = 231) message should have reported higher levels of 
threat than those in the supportive (M = 3.95, SD = 1.50, n = 97) and control (M = 3.80, 
SD = 1.67, n = 69) conditions.  A univariate ANOVA including the inoculation, 
supportive, and control conditions (i.e., the entire study population n = 513) indicated that 
inoculation messages generated significantly more threat than the control (F(2, 394) = 
11.02, p < .01, = .03) or supportive (F(2, 394) = 14.16, p < .01, = .03) treatment 
messages.  Based on the results of the threat manipulation check the remainder of the 
analyses in this investigation were conducted. 
The second manipulation check was performed to assess whether or not 
inoculation treatments successfully generated higher counterarguing output than 
supportive or control treatments following the phase three attack message.  Participants 
were provided a list of counterarguments and asked to designate which ones they had 
previously considered regarding selling stock during a market downturn.  Then 
participants were then asked to rate the strength of the counterarguments they selected on 
a one to seven scale.  A multivariate analysis was conducted to see if participant number 
or strength of counterarguments varied across treatment message conditions.  Although 
the multivariate test did not indicate a statistically significant difference (F(4, 586) = 
1.59, p = .18) the means were in the anticipated direction for both, arguments checked off 
(inoculation, M = 4.22, SD = 4.22, n = 199; supportive, M = 3.53, SD = 4.33, n = 58; 
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control, M = 3.05, SD = 3.68, n = 39) and argument strength (inoculation, M = 4.90, SD = 
2.23, n = 199; supportive, M = 4.24, SD = 2.67, n = 58; control, M = 4.83, SD = 2.14, n = 
39).  Since previous studies have shown that inoculation can function without first going 
through the internal counterarguing mechanism (Mason, 2011) and relies primarily on 
threat, the rest of the analyses this investigation were conducted as planned. 
Multivariate and Univariate Results 
 The first omnibus test in this investigation was conducted to assess possible 
differences among inoculation, supportive, and control groups in the crisis condition.  
Initial involvement and risk aversion propensity were considered as covariates.  The 
results of the MANCOVA indicated that, while differences among the message groups 
did exist (F(4, 582) = 3.84, p < .05, partial = .03), initial involvement (F(2, 290) = 
1.74, p = .18) and risk (F(2, 290) = 2.18, p = .12) were not significant covariates.  
Therefore the analysis was rerun as Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
without the covariates.    
 The MANOVA results indicated significant differences (F(4, 586) = 4.07, p < .05, 
partial = .03) among the three treatment groups.  The univariate tests that followed 
showed significant effects of the message condition on belief level (F(2, 293) = 7.80, p < 
.01, partial = .05) and the results approached significance for belief certainty (F(2, 
293) = 2.94, p = .054). 
 A second multivariate analysis was conducted to detect differences among 
participants in the inoculation, supportive, and control groups who were not exposed to a 
persuasive attack in the form of a crisis situation.  Initial involvement and risk aversion 
propensity were considered as covariates.  The results of the MANCOVA indicated that 
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no significant differences existed among treatment groups (F(4, 194) = 1.58, p = .18).  In 
addition, initial involvement (F(2, 96) =.85, p = .43) and risk aversion propensity (F(2, 
96) = 1.20, p = .31) were not significant covariates. 
 Due to the statistical insignificance of the covariates in the MANCOVA the 
analysis was rerun without the covariates.  Once again no significant differences were 
detected among the inoculation, supportive, and control message groups (F(4, 198) = 
1.70, p = .16).  Hence, univariate tests were not conducted. 
 The third and final multivaraite analysis in this investigation was a 2 
(inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANCOVA.  Initial involvement and risk 
aversion propensity were once again considered as covariates.  The results indicated that 
significant differences existed among the message groups (F(6, 310) = 3.45, p < .01, 
partial = .06).  However, initial involvement (F(2, 154) = .75, p = .48) and risk 
aversion propensity (F(2, 154) = 1.01, p = .34) were once again not significant as 
covariates. 
 Due to the statistical insignificance of the covariates in the 2 (inoculation/control) 
x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANCOVA, the analysis was rerun as MANOVA.  The results again 
indicated a significant difference among the message groups (F(6, 314) = 3.65, p < .01, 
partial = .07).  The univariate tests that followed the MANOVA indicated that the 
treatment message (or lack thereof in the case of the control group) had a significant 
impact on belief level (F(3, 157) = 4.67, p < .01, = .08) and belief certainty (F(3, 157) 
= 3.41, p < .05, = .06). 
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Hypotheses 
Hypotheses addressing message effects in crisis.  Hypotheses one and two dealt 
with the ability of inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs better than supportive and 
control messages when the attack message indicated crisis.  The MANOVA results for 
hypotheses one and two indicated significant differences (F(4, 586) = 4.07, p < .05, 
partial = .03) among the three treatment groups.  The univariate tests that followed 
showed significant effects of the message condition on belief level (F(2, 293) = 7.80, p < 
.01, partial = .05) and the results approached significance for belief certainty (F(2, 
293) = 2.94, p = .054).  Planned comparisons were conducted to compare individual 
means and thus fully assess the hypotheses.  Therefore, Dunn’s planned comparisons (see 
Kirk, 1995) were used to assess both belief and belief certainty levels of participants.   
 Hypothesis one addressed the ability of inoculation messages to protect beliefs 
better than control messages when participants were exposed to an attack message 
indicating crisis.  Specifically, hypothesis one predicted that participants would report 
higher SIM beliefs (H1a) and greater certainty in SIM beliefs (H1b) when exposed to an 
inoculation message than when exposed to a control message.  Planned comparisons 
provided support for both parts (a and b) of this hypothesis.  Participants exposed to an 
inoculation message reported both higher levels of belief (H1a) (F(1, 236) = 13.5, p < 
.01, = .04) and belief certainty (H1b) (F(1, 236) = 4.84, p < .05, = .02) than those in 
the control group (see Table 4.1). 
 Hypothesis two dealt with the ability of inoculation messages to protect beliefs 
better than supportive messages when participants were exposed to an attack message 
indicating crisis.  Hypothesis two predicted that participants would report higher SIM 
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beliefs and greater certainty in SIM beliefs when exposed to an inoculation message than 
when exposed to a supportive message.  Planned comparisons provided partial support 
for this hypothesis.  Inoculation messages protected beliefs (H2a) better than supportive 
messages (F(1, 255) = 4.52, p < .05, = .01) but certainty (H2b) in those beliefs was not 
significantly different between participants who received the inoculation and supportive 
messages (F(1, 255) = 2.04, p = .15) (see Table 4.1). 
Hypotheses addressing message effects in absence of a crisis.  Hypotheses 
three and four were designed to explore the potential effects of inoculation and 
supportive messages in absence of a crisis.  A no message control group was also a part 
of the analysis.  Namely, hypotheses three and four predicted that, in absence of an attack 
indicating crisis, the beliefs and certainty of participants exposed to an inoculation 
message would not vary significantly from participants in the control and supportive 
groups.  Stated simply, hypotheses three and four predicted that inoculation messages 
would not harm the SIM belief levels of participants if a crisis did not occur and thus null 
hypotheses were advanced.   
Since this section of analysis proposed null hypotheses a test of statistical power 
was conducted.  The purpose of the power test was to ascertain whether or not the sample 
size was sufficient to detect differences among groups.  An estimated effect size of r = 
.20 was used since this is the average effect size in inoculation studies as established by 
recent meta-analysis (Banas & Rains, 2010).  Combined with the commonly accepted 
measurement standards for power analysis (α = .95, 1 – β = .80; Cohen, 1990) it was 
ascertained that a sample size of 153 participants should generate an acceptable level of 
power (see Ivanov et al., 2009a).  Given that the sample size exceeded this estimate the 
  57 
analysis of hypotheses three and four proceeded.  Multivariate test results supported null 
hypotheses three and four (F(4, 198) = 1.70, p = .16).   
Hypothesis addressing the effect of crisis modality.  Hypothesis five concerned 
whether inoculation messages could protect beliefs equally well when participants were 
exposed to a print and video crisis message.  Namely, hypothesis five predicted that 
participants who had been exposed to an inoculation message would report lower SIM 
beliefs (H5a) and lower certainty in those beliefs (H5b) when exposed to a crisis message 
through video than when exposed to a crisis message through print.  An independent 
samples t-test did not provide support for either part of this hypothesis.  Participants 
exposed to a video crisis (M = -.84, SD = 1.52, n = 34) did not report lower belief levels 
(t(197) = -.82, p = .41) than participants exposed to a print crisis (M = -.64, SD = 1. 25, n 
= 165).  Similarly, belief certainty (t(197) = -.26, p = .74) did not vary significantly 
between participants in the video (M = .94, SD = 40.21, n = 34) and print (M = -1.26, SD 
= 41.20, n = 165) conditions. 
Hypotheses addressing the impact of PIT instructions.  Hypotheses six 
through nine dealt with the impact of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation process.  
The 2 (inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANOVA indicated significant differences 
(F(6, 314) = 3.65, p < .01, partial = .07) on at least one of the dependent variables.  
Univariate tests were used to further explore omnibus test results and showed that the 
treatment message (or lack thereof in the case of the control group) had a significant 
impact on belief level (F(3, 157) = 4.67, p < .01, = .08) and belief certainty (F(3, 157) 
= 3.41, p < .05, = .06).  Dunn’s planned comparisons were used to assess both belief 
levels (H6a, H7a, H8a, and H9a) and belief certainty levels (H6b, H7b, H8b, and H9b).   
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Hypothesis six predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation message 
asking them to not engage in PIT would report higher SIM beliefs (H6a) and greater 
certainty in those beliefs (H6b) than participants in the control condition.  Planned 
comparisons provided partial support for this hypothesis.  Compared to the control 
condition, participants in the no PIT group reported higher levels of SIM beliefs (F(1, 78) 
= 10.25, p < .01, = .06) but not greater certainty in those beliefs (F(1, 78) = .13, p = 
.72) (see Table 4.2). 
 Hypothesis seven predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation message 
asking them to not engage in PIT would report lower SIM beliefs (H7a) and lower 
certainty in those beliefs (H7b) than participants exposed to an inoculation message 
without mention of PIT.  Planned comparisons did not provide support for this 
hypothesis.  No significant differences in beliefs (F(1, 74) = .84, p = .36) or certainty 
(F(1, 74) = .39, p = .53) were found (see Table 4.2). 
 Hypothesis eight addressed the effectiveness of an inoculation message asking 
participants to engage in PIT versus an inoculation message without mention of PIT.  
Specifically, hypothesis eight predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation 
message asking them to engage in PIT would report higher levels of SIM beliefs (H8a) 
and higher certainty in those beliefs (H8b) than participants exposed to an inoculation 
message without mention of PIT.  Planned comparisons did not provide support for this 
hypothesis.  No significant differences in beliefs (F(1, 81) = .91, p = .34) were found, 
however statistical difference was approached in belief certainty (F(1, 81) = 3.20, p = 
.08) (see Table 4.2). 
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 Hypothesis nine predicted that participants who were exposed to an inoculation 
message asking that they engage in PIT would report greater levels of SIM beliefs (H9a) 
and greater certainty in those beliefs (H9b) than participants who were exposed to an 
inoculation message asking that they not engage in PIT.  Planned comparisons provided 
partial support for this hypothesis.  Participants in the PIT condition did not report higher 
belief levels (F(1, 86) = .00, p = 1.00) but did report greater certainty in their beliefs (F(1, 
86) = 6.39, p < .05, = .04) than those participants in the no PIT condition (see Table 
4.2). 
Hypothesis addressing gain and loss frame inoculation messages.  Hypothesis 
ten dealt with inoculation messages that employed a gain frame versus those that 
employed a loss frame.  Specifically, hypothesis ten predicted that participants exposed to 
a loss frame inoculation message would report higher levels of SIM beliefs (H10a) and 
higher certainty in those beliefs (H10b) than participants exposed to a gain frame 
inoculation message.  An independent samples t-test provided partial support for 
hypothesis ten.  Participants in the loss frame condition (M = -.54, SD = 1.22, n = 157) 
reported higher SIM beliefs (t (53.09) = 2.79, p < .01, = .13) than those in the gain 
frame condition (M = -1.26, SD = 1.50, n = 40).  While the results were in the anticipated 
direction (loss frame M = .77, SD = 41.55, n = 157; gain frame M = -7.83, SD = 38.26, n 
= 40), the scores for belief certainty fell short of statistical significance (t (195) = 1.19, p 
= .12). 
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Table 4.1 
Message effects in crisis and no crisis (Hypotheses 1-4) 
  
                                          Dependent Variable       M 
          (SD) 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  Beliefs were measured at the end of Phase 1 and Phase 3 using a seven point scale.  
Certainty was measured with a 1-100 rating.  Index changes scores between phases one 
and three were calculated for beliefs and certainty, with zero representing no change, a 
positive change representing belief strengthening, and a negative change representing 
belief weakening. 
abIndicate significantly different groups within variable and market scenario at p < .01.   
  cIndicates significantly different groups within variable and market scenario at p < .05. 
 
      Belief 
       _______________ 
          Certainty 
___________________ 
Inoculation   
Crisis 
n = 199 
-.68ab 
(1.30) 
-.88c 
(40.94) 
No Crisis 
n = 32 
-.61 
(1.57) 
2.22 
(18.84) 
 
Supportive 
 
  
Crisis 
n = 58 
-1.15a 
(1.91) 
-10.00 
(51.33) 
No Crisis 
n = 39 
-.44 
(1.26) 
-8.08 
(27.13) 
 
Control 
 
  
Crisis 
n = 39 
-1.64b 
(1.75) 
-17.36c 
(37.67) 
No Crisis 
n = 31 
-.84 
(1.39) 
8.26 
(45.91) 
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Table 4.2 
Impact of explicit PIT instructions (Hypotheses 6-9)  
Dependent Variable  M 
    (SD) 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  Beliefs were measured at the end of Phase 1 and Phase 3 using a seven point scale.  
Certainty was measured with a 1-100 rating.  Index changes scores between phases one 
and three were calculated for beliefs and certainty, with zero representing no change, a 
positive change representing belief strengthening, and a negative change representing 
belief weakening. 
aIndicates significantly different groups within variable at p < .01.   
bIndicates significantly different groups within variable at p < .05. 
 
 
Belief 
__________ 
Certainty 
__________ 
        Inoculation (standard) 
n = 35 
-.90 
(1.48) 
-8.37 
(36.34) 
   
         Inoculation (PIT) 
n = 47 
-.59 
(1.13) 
7.45b 
(41.95) 
 
 
  
    Inoculation (no PIT) 
n = 40 
-.59a 
(1.46) 
-14.10b 
(41.37) 
   
Control 
n = 39 
-1.64a 
(1.75) 
-17.36 
(37.67) 
  62 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Discussion 
The primary purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not 
inoculation messages are a viable communication strategy to preemptively protect SIM 
beliefs during forthcoming financial crises.  Ancillary purposes of this study were to 
further investigate the role of print and video crises, explicit instructions regarding PIT, 
and gain and loss frame inoculation messages on the inoculation process.  Hence, this 
section will begin with a discussion of the practical implications of the findings and will 
be followed by a review of the study’s limitations.  Next, suggestions for future research 
will be provided and these will address theoretical questions raised by this investigation.  
This study will end with brief concluding remarks. 
 The primary purpose of this study was of a practical nature.  A commonly 
occurring phenomenon in the investing world is collapsed SIM beliefs amidst financial 
crisis.  In review, collapsed SIM beliefs are unplanned securities sales in reaction to 
unfavorable new or events.  Given the perpetual ups and downs of securities markets, 
collapsed SIM beliefs can be a frequent and persistent occurrence.  While the knee-jerk 
sale of securities might ease investor anxiety in the short term, the long-term 
consequences of not adhering to a sound investment plan can be devastating.  Not only 
can widespread securities sales worsen an existing financial crisis by deepening losses for 
financial institutions and the market as a whole, but in the age when people are expected 
to save and plan for their own retirement portfolio losses can have very real and harmful 
consequences for the general investing public.  Furthermore, since financial institutions 
aiming to protect SIM beliefs never know when a crisis will occur – only that one 
inevitably will (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Rotheli, 2007) – a preemptive crisis 
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communication strategy is a paramount concern. 
Therefore, the findings related to hypotheses one through four in this study are 
extremely encouraging.  The results of this investigation clearly support inoculation’s 
viability as a preemptive crisis communication strategy.  Similar to other studies that 
have addressed inoculation in the crisis communication context (Wan & Pfau, 2004; 
Wigley & Pfau, 2010), the results of this investigation demonstrate that inoculation 
messages prevent belief slippage better than controls when participants are faced with an 
attack in the form of a crisis situation.  However, unlike previous inoculation studies in 
the crisis communication context that predicted but did not find a significant difference 
between inoculation and supportive conditions, this study indicates that inoculation is a 
superior belief protection strategy compared to supportive-only messages.  The strength 
of an inoculation strategy as opposed to a supportive-only strategy is more in line with 
the vast amount of inoculation research outside of the crisis communication context (see 
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005).   
As researchers have illustrated (Compton & Pfau, 2005), even though research 
results have been largely positive for inoculation theory a practitioner hesitation has been 
a preference for a supportive strategy.  And certainly use of a supportive strategy is better 
than not communicating at all.  Research results in this study and numerous others (see 
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005) have shown less belief change for 
supportive messages as opposed to control or no message groups.  These effects have 
persisted across no crisis and crisis contexts. Thus, when faced with the option of not 
communicating at all, a supportive strategy is advocated. 
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However, an argument from the scholarly community – namely those who study 
inoculation – has been that the time and effort put into communication campaigns could 
be more beneficial if a more effective message strategy was used.  Consistent research 
findings spanning five decades have pointed to the superiority of inoculation messages as 
opposed to supportive ones in contexts such as corporate advertising and public relations 
(Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau, 1992; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & 
Wigley, 2007; Pfau & Wan, 2006), political campaigns (An & Pfau, 2004; Compton & 
Ivanov, 2013; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), adolescent 
health campaigns (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Pfau & 
Van Bockern, 1994), differences in cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker, Miller, 
& Pfau, 2012), interpersonal communication (Sutton, 2011), and instructional/educational 
communication (Compton & Pfau, 2008).   
This study extends that well-founded argument – that using an inoculation-based 
message strategy is better than using a supportive one – into the realm of crisis 
communication.  While previous inoculation work has shown that a company should 
choose inoculation over not communicating in crisis (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 
2010), results of this study beg for consideration of an inoculation strategy to replace an 
existing or planned supportive one.  This investigation adds strength to the argument that 
an inoculation strategy is more effective, particularly since this study replicated 
inoculation-superior findings into a new context.  
In addition, an inoculation strategy might be particularly appealing to 
practitioners in the crisis communication context.  A major concern for practitioners 
considering an inoculation strategy has been pointing out weaknesses of an organization 
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or industry unnecessarily (Compton & Pfau, 2005).  Therefore, in an applied setting 
practitioners have shown an increased comfort level with a supportive, or bolstering, 
strategy (Compton & Pfau, 2005). However, when used in a crisis context practitioners 
could view an inoculation strategy as simply a more controlled way of managing 
stakeholder perception of weaknesses.  Since crises are inevitable (Mitroff & Pearson, 
1993), especially in the investing arena (Rotheli, 2007), practitioners would do well to 
realize that at some point their organization’s or industry’s flaws will be addressed by an 
external party.  Would it be better for stakeholders to have been exposed to potential 
weaknesses in a structured way via an inoculation message or to face crisis and the 
corresponding reputational damage (see Benoit, 1997) with no prior warning?  Stated 
simply, would practitioners rather address their weaknesses preemptively or have 
someone else do it for them?  The research findings concerning inoculation demonstrate 
the advantage for using an inoculation strategy prior to persuasive attack, which can now 
also be understood as a crisis situation. 
Furthermore, this study extends previous inoculation and crisis communication 
work (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) by extending the possible scope of 
inoculation’s impact.  While other studies concerning inoculation and crisis 
communication have focused on messages related to a specific company (Wan & Pfau, 
2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010), this study found support for inoculation messages when the 
content of the treatment and attack messages related to an industry-wide crisis.  
Inoculation messages protected SIM beliefs when faced with an attack message that 
indicated widespread stock market sell-offs as opposed to trouble or crisis at a specific 
financial institution.  This finding greatly boosts inoculation’s value as a preemptive 
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crisis communication strategy.  If, as previously mentioned, a practitioner concern is 
unnecessarily pointing out organizational weaknesses, the strategy could still be effective 
if the inoculation message focused on the industry as a whole rather than the 
organization.  Furthermore, since the details of a crisis are not known in advance, the 
ability to focus the preemptive message on the industry as a whole might further ensure 
practitioners that the protection would extend into future unknown crises. 
 Another key question posed in this study was whether or not inoculation messages 
could actually harm beliefs in the absence of a crisis.  As demonstrated by the support for 
hypotheses three and four, inoculation messages did not harm beliefs in absence of a 
crisis when compared with supportive and control messages.  This finding should further 
ease practitioner hesitation about using an inoculation as compared to a supportive 
message strategy. An obvious question for practitioners would be that since inoculation 
involves going outside of an organization’s comfort zone to address forthcoming 
concerns what happens if a crisis never comes?  In other words, what is the risk to 
stakeholder perceptions that would otherwise be untouched?  The findings regarding 
hypotheses three and four address this valid concern.  Practitioners should feel assured 
that not only do inoculation messages prepare for an impending crisis, but that the 
potential risk of harming stakeholder beliefs in absence of a crisis is mitigated. 
 The collective results for hypotheses one through four provide intriguing 
possibilities for communication practitioners.  The results related to hypotheses one 
through four clearly indicate that, yes, inoculation messages can provide a viable message 
strategy for the protection of SIM beliefs.  This finding provides a valuable asset for 
financial institutions and special interest organizations looking to stabilize the financial 
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health of investors and the market as a whole.  This finding also provides support for 
recent suggestions (Kim, 2013) that inoculation can be used as a preemptive crisis 
communication strategy in the organizational communication context.  Furthermore, 
three of the four barriers to inoculation’s practical use reviewed earlier in this study – the 
preference for no communication, the preference for a bolstering strategy, and concerns 
about the impact of inoculation message in absence of a crisis – are addressed with the 
results of hypotheses one through four.  Inoculation messages performed better than the 
no message control group and supportive messages and did not harm beliefs in absence of 
a crisis. 
 The fourth barrier to inoculation’s use – concerns about the impact of the crisis 
communication medium – was addressed by the hypothesis five results.  As discussed 
earlier in this study, inoculation research until this point has almost solely tested the 
effectiveness of inoculation messages by using a print attack message (see Banas & 
Rains, 2010).  Therefore, to meet this study’s primary goal of investigating the applied 
value of inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs an imperative question was whether 
or not multimodal attack messages, which actual investors are certain to face, could derail 
the belief protection created by inoculation messages.   
The medium-theory (see Meyrowitz 1985; 1994) based hypothesis five actually 
predicted that the concern about crisis communication medium was legitimate and that 
for inoculated participants video crisis messages would lessen SIM beliefs more than 
print crisis messages.  While the lack of support for hypothesis five raises questions about 
medium theory, the results are extremely positive for the overall implications of this 
study.  Since video and print crisis messages did not significantly impact inoculation’s 
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ability to protect beliefs the fourth barrier to inoculation’s use a crisis communication 
strategy is addressed.  Based on the results of this study organizations should feel 
confident that inoculating their stakeholders is even more worthwhile since the belief 
protection created may be able to withstand attacks presented through multimodal (e.g., 
video) in addition to print formats.  Combined with past novel counterargument findings 
(Pfau 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), and multiple attack findings (Ivanov et al., 2009a) the 
support for protection against multimodal attack formats broadens the scope of 
inoculation’s applied potential.  Furthermore, the vast amount of inoculation research that 
employs an attack in print form is more applicable to the crisis communication context.  
Along those lines, and not wholly related to this work, this finding boosts the validity of 
inoculation research as a whole since the communication environment is becoming 
increasingly multimodal (Quandt & von Pape, 2010).  
 As previously mentioned, another ancillary purpose of this investigation was to 
further explore the role of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation process.  
Hypotheses six through nine addressed this purpose.  Until recently (Ivanov et al., 2012; 
Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012) inoculation was thought to be an entirely internal subvocal 
process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005). However, recent research by Ivanov and colleagues 
had indicated that talk following the inoculation process might strengthen resistance.  
While this finding was intriguing, further support for the impact of PIT threatened the 
validity of decades of inoculation work that assumed internal processing of the 
inoculation message (Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012).  Therefore this investigation responded 
to Ivanov and colleagues’ call to further explore the PIT and inoculation relationship. 
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 The findings of this study indicate that, in line with the original underpinnings of 
inoculation theory (McGuire 1962; 1964), the strengthening (or lack of erosion) of beliefs 
is primarily an internal process.  Both PIT and no PIT inoculation messages generated 
belief protection equally well.  As expected, all of the inoculation conditions (standard, 
PIT, and no PIT) showed more belief protection than the no message control group.  As 
such the findings of this study suggest that the inoculation message is primarily 
responsible for creating belief protection and explicit PIT instructions might not impact 
the formation of belief protection as much as recently suggested (Ivanov, Miller, et al., 
2012).   
While PIT did not impact belief levels in this investigation, the results indicate 
that PIT can impact belief certainty.  Compared to the no PIT condition, the PIT group 
participants reported more certainty in their SIM beliefs, thus supporting hypothesis H9b.  
This finding indicates that though talking about the content of the inoculation treatment 
might not establish belief protection, PIT can still serve a valuable function in the 
inoculation process.  In addition, even though the results were not statistically significant, 
the trend of other results concerning PIT and certainty points to a positive relationship.  
When participants were instructed to talk about the issue (PIT) they reported more 
certainty in their beliefs than those who received a standard inoculation message with 
instruction to refrain from PIT (no PIT).  The findings regarding PIT and belief certainty 
in this investigation point to an agreement with Ivanov and colleagues’ (2012) suggestion 
that PIT functions as reassurance and advocacy for inoculated individuals’ positions.   
The theoretical implications and future research directions based on the PIT 
findings in this study will be discussed later in this investigation.  Here it should be noted 
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that the PIT findings also further the practical utility of inoculation theory, which is a 
primary goal of this study.  In contrast to the Ivanov et al. (2012) study the findings here 
seem to delineate between the function of the inoculation message itself – to create the 
protection – and the enhancement potential of PIT instructions to strengthen the created 
protection.  This study raises a new possibility regarding past PIT research, however. 
Ivanov and colleagues (2012) did not separately measure attitudes and attitudinal 
certainty.  Therefore, some of the enhanced attitude protection they found as a result of 
PIT could have actually been an increase in certainty. 
This separation of the inoculation message and PIT functions can especially aid 
practitioners in contexts where interpersonal discussion is likely and/or possible.  If 
practitioners know that the inoculated individuals will have a chance to discuss their 
views then presumably an explicit PIT instruction can be used to strengthen generated 
belief protection.  An example from past research is in the form of adolescent health 
campaigns (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Parker et al., 2012; Pfau et al., 1992; Pfau & Van 
Bockern, 1994).  In this context inoculation messages have typically been directed at 
school age students, who have almost daily contact with each other in the school setting.  
Therefore encouraging PIT in an inoculation message geared towards this group could 
increase belief certainty and therefore belief protection. 
The final ancillary goal of this study was to join the well-established Prospect 
Theory (PT) with inoculation research.  The context of investing – and the corresponding 
typical use of gain and loss language – presented a prime opportunity to introduce PT 
into inoculation research.  Results of this study revealed, by providing partial support for 
hypothesis ten, that using a loss frame inoculation message did indeed increase belief 
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level when compared with the participants who received a gain frame inoculation 
message.  While the results were not statistically significant, cautious support can also be 
given to the ability of a loss-framed inoculation message to also increase belief certainty.   
The support for PT in this study is valuable for practitioners seeking to use an 
inoculation-based strategy to protect SIM beliefs.  As noted earlier in this study, an 
attractive aspect for inoculation’s applied use is the exact, theoretically supported 
message design offered by decades of inoculation research.  The ability to boost 
inoculation’s potency by integrating PT offers even more nuanced guidance to 
practitioners seeking to protect SIM beliefs with inoculation messages.  Furthering 
inoculation’s applied value complements the primary goal of this investigation. 
Practitioners in the financial context can use this investigation as evidence that “losses 
loom larger than gains” (Rick, 2010, p. 454) when trying to mitigate the ramifications of 
unplanned securities sales with preemptive crisis messages. 
Limitations 
While this study has provided many avenues for practice (previously addressed) 
and theory (addressed in the proceeding section), some limitations should be noted.  The 
main limitation of this study concerns the study population.  As previously mentioned, 
the use of university students as a convenience sample could be considered a limitation as 
the implications of the results for actual investors could be questionable.  Without 
knowledge of the terminology or fundamental principles of investing participants could 
have been overwhelmed and thus not participated to the best of their ability.  However, 
this study posits that the lack of investing experience assumed and reported by the study 
population actually boosts the validity of the study.  Without incurring actual stock 
market losses the student population can be viewed as a more objective pool of 
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participants.  Nonetheless, the results of this study should be replicated with actual stock 
market investors to enhance the validity. 
However, if the use of students threatens the validity of the results and 
necessitates the use of actual investors then a derivative limitation is the inability to 
isolate the actual experiences of investors.  Affect tied to stock market gains and losses, 
investing confidence, or investing knowledge level could interfere with study responses.  
The inherent complications in establishing a suitable study population can presumably be 
addressed by replicating study results across both inexperienced (possibly student) and 
experienced investing populations.  
An additional limitation in this study was the failure of the counterarguing 
manipulation in phase three.  Though research (Mason, 2011) has indicated that 
inoculation can bypass the counterarguing mechanism and function solely on elicited 
threat, counterarguing is still considered an important part of the inoculation process 
(Compton, 2013).  As such an inoculation message should generate counterarguing in 
support of the person’s beliefs and against the persuasive attack.  Part of the reason the 
messages in this study did not produce sufficient counterarguing might have been that 
subjects did not have a firm grasp on the investing terminology inherent in this context of 
study.   
While the scales and items in phases one and two of the study (see Appendix A), 
including the successful threat manipulation check, included very general statements 
(e.g., “People should sell their stock when the market is down” [belief] and “I find the 
possibility of being persuaded to sell stock during a down market to be” [threat]), the 
counterarguing measure was more specific.  The 12 statements that participants were 
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asked to review were more technical in nature despite an effort to simplify them (e.g., 
“Investments should be held during a market downturn to benefit from future upswings”; 
“Investors should not have to worry that they are losing money, so they should sell their 
securities when the value goes down”; “Investors should purchase investments with the 
attitude that holdings should be sold if a bad market makes them nervous”) (see 
Appendix A).  The directions of the counterarguing measure asked participants to “Check 
off ONLY arguments that you thought of about the issue of selling stock when the market 
is down.”  Therefore, if participants did not internally phrase their counterarguments 
using the terminology provided in the measure, but rather just had a general concept of 
not selling stocks in down markets, they might have chosen to not check off a 
counterargument they actually considered.  Given the complications of capturing 
counterarguing in this study future studies in the investing context should simplify the 
language in the counterarguing measure, in addition to allowing participants to also use a 
thought-listing measure (Banas & Bessarabova, 2009; Ivanov, Parker, & Dillingham, 
2012). 
The statistical insignificance of the initial involvement covariate in this study was 
also perplexing and possibly a limitation.  Repeated studies (see Banas & Rains, 2010; 
Pfau et al., 1997; 2003; 2004; 2005) have shown that involvement plays a role in the 
strength of a person’s conferred resistance.  Namely, moderate involvement levels (Banas 
& Rains, 2010) are most conducive for generating resistance as opposed to high and low 
involvement levels.  Since, as seen in three MANCOVA analyses, involvement did not 
vary participants’ generated resistance the results suggest that possibly the issue was not 
involving enough for the study population.  This suspicion is somewhat confirmed by the 
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lack of investing experience reported by participants.  Since the issue was not wholly 
relevant to participants the results might have been weaker than they would have been 
with either a different population or a different and more involving crisis.  
Finally, a contextual limitation should be noted.  Inoculation showed success in 
the context of protecting SIM beliefs amidst an industry-wide financial crisis.  The 
context of investing lent itself well to testing inoculation in the crisis communication 
context since threat was easily elicited due to inherent gain and loss language.  Therefore, 
the findings in this study could be issue specific.  As such future studies should explore 
whether or not industry-wide crisis messages are effective outside the investing context.  
Suggestions for future research in that area are discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
Future Studies  
 This investigation prompts exciting future research.  The discussion of future 
studies is grouped categorically in the proceeding paragraphs.  
Inoculation and crises.  This study indicates that the belief protection created by 
inoculation messages applies when the attack message indicates a crisis situation.  
However, future research needs to further nuance inoculation’s role as a crisis 
communication strategy.  To date only two other studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & 
Pfau, 2010) besides this investigation explore inoculation in the crisis communication 
context.  The results of this study differ from the other two crisis studies in two ways: 
first, in contrast to Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010), inoculation 
messages performed better than supportive messages, and, second, the protection created 
by inoculation messages extended beyond a company-specific attack. 
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To continue the study of inoculation and crisis future studies need to attempt to 
replicate the inoculation-superior findings.  Even though the results of this study align 
with the majority of inoculation studies that have found inoculation messages to protect 
beliefs better than supportive-only messages (see Compton & Pfau, 2005), these findings 
are in the minority among other inoculation-based crisis communication studies (Wan & 
Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010).  Therefore, further work is needed to confirm the 
finding in that inoculation messages can protect belief slippage better than supportive 
messages in a crisis situation. 
In addition, while this study demonstrates inoculation’s value in the financial 
context, further work needs to explore inoculation’s potential in other industries and 
crisis types.  Specifically, even though inoculation messages protected against a non-
company specific message in this study will that protection apply in a different context?   
Furthermore, even though research has previously established that inoculation can 
protect against novel counterarguments (Pfau, 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), how far does 
this protection extend in crisis situations?  For example, can inoculation messages about 
the financial industry protect financial attitudes that might decline as a result of political 
or social uncertainty?  Previous work (Parker et al., 2012) suggests that cross-protection 
can occur in the interpersonal communication context, but to what extent does that cross-
protection translate in the crisis communication context and on a larger scale?  Can 
inoculation messages about preparedness in general protect against panic following, for 
example, a natural disaster?  In the organizational communication context, can 
inoculation messages embedded in corporate advertising as Kim (2013) suggests protect 
beliefs about an industry as a whole?  These questions are important for the use of 
  76 
inoculation messages in crisis communication but are not answered by the current 
investigation. 
Modality of treatment and attack messages.  The findings of this study 
regarding multimodal communication formats advance inoculation theory as a whole.  
The finding that inoculation messages can protect beliefs equally well against attacks 
presented through video and through print boosts the practical utility of the theory.  
However, the unsupported hypothesis five is also beneficial for inoculation scholarship.  
Since inoculation research has almost exclusively used print treatment and attack 
messages (see Banas & Rains, 2010) and treated modality as a “neutral conduit of 
message content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195), a significant difference between print and video 
messages would have challenged the validity of foundational studies.   
The current finding – that there is no significant difference between print and 
video crisis messages’ ability to threaten inoculated individuals’ beliefs – aligns with the 
Pfau et al. (2000) study that found no difference between print and video inoculation 
messages.  Taken together these two studies, the only two to explicitly address modality, 
suggest that indeed communication modality does not significantly impact the inoculation 
process.  While this finding is challenging to the hypotheses advanced in this study it 
further validates past research using print inoculation and attack messages. 
As mentioned the preceding paragraph, this study is only the second to purposely 
investigate communication modality and the first to hypothesize about a video attack 
message.  Therefore, in some ways it is encouraging that this study aligns with the 
findings of Pfau and colleagues (2000) that surmise little to no differences exist among 
communication modalities.  However, some nagging questions about communication 
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modality and inoculation exist that are not answered by this research.   
First, as addressed earlier in this study, three extant inoculation studies (An & 
Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) have used print and video messages 
interchangeably and found equivocal results with regard to conferring resistance to 
persuasion.  This seems to be more than chance, since Godbold and Pfau (2000) could 
not protect against video attacks with video inoculation messages, Nabi (2003) found that 
resistance created via a traditional “talking head” news format did not protect well 
against a video attack, and An and Pfau (2004) did not have success protecting against 
video attacks with print inoculation messages.   
The cofounding results in these studies are what would be expected when viewed 
through the lens of a great deal of mass media research (see Biocca, 2008; McQuail, 
2010).  The claim that print and video mediums are equivalent is in direct opposition to 
most mass media theorizing. Whether mass media scholars argue that video is a more 
engaging format (e.g., Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994; Wiegman, 1989) or print is a more 
engaging format (e.g., Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010), both groups agree that media 
formats vary in their impact.  Could it be that print is more engaging in some cases due to 
the attention required for reading while in other cases the multi-sensory experience of 
video would more thoroughly capture interest?  What about video messages that have 
print elements, such as a news program with a ticker display on the bottom of the screen? 
An alternate explanation for the confounding modality results in this and other 
inoculation studies (i.e., An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) could be 
that some feature of the inoculation process or aspect of inoculation research 
differentiates modality in inoculation from modality in other theoretical processes.  Do 
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the varying contexts of inoculation research explain the theoretical stalemate between 
print and video messages?  Or does some feature of the inoculation truly make it a rare 
case exception of a-modality – a protected space in which modality truly does not matter?  
If inoculation is indeed an exception to the modality differences discussed in other areas 
of communication scholarship (see McQuail, 2010) then further research is needed to 
ascertain exactly what levels the playing field among modalities. Further research is 
especially important since studies have tested print inoculation messages with a print 
attack (see Compton & Pfau, 2005), video inoculation treatments with a print attack (Pfau 
et al., 2000) and a print inoculation message with a video attack (current study) but has 
yet to explicitly explore the impact of a video attack on a video inoculation message. 
Finally, the results of this investigation could point to a more complex issue than 
the two explanations covered earlier in this section.  What if rather than uniform or 
situational strengths, video and print simply engage participants differently and thus 
cannot be conclusively compared?  Namely, what if the engaging aspects of video 
processing (Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994) and the engaging aspects of print processing 
(Biocca, 2008; McQuail, 2010) void the other’s strengths?  As mentioned earlier in this 
investigation, Mazzoco and colleagues (2000; 2006) argue that the cognitive resources 
required to consume multiple media forms (e.g., video) leave less cognitive resources 
available to engage in other mental processes, which some scholars (Ivanov et al., 2009a) 
note could include processing of inoculation messages.  On the other hand, print 
messages are much harder to actively process since reading is required (see Biocca, 2008; 
McQuail, 2010).  Can a person really reach the necessary level of threat activation and 
produce relevant counterarguments in response to an inoculation message while he or she 
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is reading?  Needless to say, further research surrounding modality and the inoculation 
process is needed based on the results of this and other investigations. 
Hypotheses addressing the impact of PIT.  Several of the hypotheses in this 
study were designed to explore the impact of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation 
process.  Given the burgeoning nature of PIT study this section will compare several 
aspects of this work with the Ivanov, Miller, and colleagues (2012) findings and use the 
comparison to raise PIT-related questions prompted by this work.   
Both this study and the Ivanov, Miller et al. (2012) study found that messages 
containing explicit PIT instructions generated resistance.  However, the results regarding 
the change in outcome variables differ between studies.  Ivanov and colleagues found that 
explicit PIT instructions increased resistance to attitude change, suggesting a vocal 
component to what was previously considered a subvocal process (Compton & Pfau, 
2005).  Meanwhile, this study focused on belief change as the primary dependent variable 
and did not see an increase in protection with explicit instructions to engage in PIT.  
Therefore results of this study support the longstanding proposition that creation of belief 
protection is a subvocal process.   
The differences in these findings could be attributed to the isolation of vocal and 
subvocal processes achieved in this study through instructions to engage and not to 
engage in PIT.  The observed resistance in the Ivanov and colleagues (2012) study could 
have actually been occurring as a subvocal process since the two were not separated.  
However, more work is needed to confirm this suggestion.  Similar to this study, future 
work that seeks to answer the major question of whether resistance is primarily a vocal or 
subvocal process needs to attempt to isolate the vocal from the subvocal.   
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Furthermore, this study also assessed certainty of beliefs.  While this issue was 
not addressed in the Ivanov et al. (2012) PIT study they did suggest that engaging in PIT 
could serve as reassurance and advocacy for the positions of inoculated individuals.  As 
such, the findings regarding certainty in this study offer a complement to the work of 
Ivanov and colleagues.  Namely, the results regarding certainty in this study could be due 
to the need for reassurance and advocacy suggested by Ivanov et al.  Future studies 
should examine this relationship by first establishing whether or not inoculated 
participants do indeed feel a need for reassurance and advocacy. Then the study should 
try to establish whether or not PIT a) fills any extant reassurance and advocacy needs, 
and/or b) increases belief certainty, as the pattern of means in this study suggests.   
Another intriguing aspect of the Ivanov et al. (2012) PIT study that was not 
considered in this work was anger as a moderating variable.  Perhaps anger was the 
missing component in this study that caused the largely insignificant results with regard 
to PIT and belief protection.  Could integrating anger eliciting components into the 
inoculation messages encourage PIT and demonstrate that PIT really does contribute to 
generated resistance?  Findings of this nature would more closely align with the Ivanov et 
al. (2012) PIT findings.  The idea that anger could promote PIT certainly has logical 
foundations.  Coping with anger more often leads to approach and possibly even 
aggression than to retrieval (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013).  Could this outward-facing type 
of anger coping mechanism not be fulfilled by PIT?  If the PIT instructions provided are 
also accompanied by anger eliciting components the combination of the two could not 
only plant the idea for PIT, but also help ensure the conversations occur.  Further 
research is needed to see if integrating anger eliciting components in the inoculation 
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message can extend the pattern of results in this study and boost belief to a significant 
level.   
Furthermore, the context of the current research poses an intriguing question 
regarding the integration of anger messages.  Previous research regarding inoculation and 
Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT) (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) suggests that 
integrating reactance – in which anger plays a significant role – can boost threat levels 
and thereby increase generated resistance.  While integrating such elements as reactance 
and anger into inoculation messages can boost resistance, is this a good idea in the crisis 
communication context?  In a crisis situation a person is already presumably feeling 
threatened by the crisis events. Therefore, would the integration of anger, and the 
corresponding increased threat, push the threat level too high?  
Research that has shown increasing threat with anger can lead to increased 
resistance (see Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) was conducted outside the crisis 
communication context.  If this coupling of anger and crisis pushed threat levels beyond 
those of the anger-enhanced messages used by Miller and colleagues the effects are 
unknown.  As Compton and Pfau (2005) note, inoculation researchers have historically 
struggled to push threat beyond moderate levels.  Given threat’s primary role in 
inoculation-generated resistance, the ability to create more threat has been a key concern 
(see Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013).  One line of thinking is that a threat ceiling or threshold 
might not exist, and more threat might simply lead to more resistance (Miller, Ivanov, et 
al., 2013).   
However, some scholars have posited that too much threat could thwart resistance 
and therefore moderate levels of threat are ideal (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Compton, 
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2009).  The idea is that there should be enough threat in the inoculation message to 
motivate a person to shore up his or her defenses, but not so much to overwhelm the 
person (Compton, 2009).  Therefore more research is needed to assess the effect of anger-
enhanced inoculation messages in crisis.  The Ivanov and colleagues (2012) PIT findings 
point to more resistance with anger integration while the consideration of the crisis 
context in tandem with PRT findings (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) point to possibly over-
eliciting threat when using anger amidst crises. 
Finally, a research direction further prompted by the current investigation is the 
use of explicit PIT instructions as a booster treatment.  Ivanov and colleagues (2012) 
suggested that PIT might serve as a booster treatment for inoculated individuals.  This 
study seems to confer that suggestion by showing increased belief certainty with PIT.  
Past studies that have investigated the effect of booster treatments (e.g., Pfau et al., 2006) 
have exposed participants to multiple inoculation treatments and shown that boosters 
function best when the second inoculation message is different than the first.  Neither this 
study nor the Ivanov et al. (2012) study used multiple inoculation messages as an outright 
booster though both point to a post-inoculation conversation as serving a booster 
function.  Not only is the suggestion of PIT as a booster unconfirmed, but future work 
needs to assess the interplay between actual booster treatments in the form of inoculation 
messages and PIT that might serve a booster function. 
Hypothesis addressing loss frame inoculation messages.  The tenth hypothesis 
in this investigation aimed to provide a perfunctory examination of possible links 
between two long-standing bodies of theoretical research, prospect theory (PT) and 
inoculation.  The complexity of the proceeding discussion necessitates an overview of 
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this subsection.  First, a general discussion of PT and one of its offspring theories, 
regulatory focus (RFT) is in order.  Next, extant inoculation studies (Mason & Miller, 
2011; Pfau et al., 2001; 2009) that have examined concepts closely related to RFT are 
reviewed.  To congeal this section three aspects of inoculation are commented on 
separately – resistance as an outcome, threat, and counterarguing.  The discussion of 
these inoculation aspects includes possible links to RFT, perspectives on past research 
(Mason & Miller, 2011; Pfau et al., 2001; 2009), insights from the current research, and 
suggestions for how RFT and inoculation could be studied together in the future. 
First, entering a discussion of PT seems incomplete without also addressing the 
vast body of related research concerning RFT.  A summary of RFT is also relevant 
because previous research (Mason & Miller, 2011) has studied inoculation through the 
RFT lens.  In its original form, as previously discussed in this study, PT posited that an 
emphasis on potential losses rather than potential gains would govern decision making 
processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  Long-standing support for the PT construct 
(see Rick, 2010) has also led to specialized theories that are based on the idea that losses 
loom larger than gains.  Of particular interest to this work is the great deal of research 
focused on regulatory focus (see Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Myers-Levy, 2007; Zou, 
Scholer, & Higgins, 2014).  RFT suggests that individuals are either prevention focused 
(oriented towards preventing loss) or promotion focused (oriented towards achieving 
gains).  Furthermore, prevention and promotion focus have shown effects as both state 
and trait variables (Zou et al., 2014).   Thus individuals can be primed for a prevention 
focus with research materials designed to emphasize losses over gains.  The assimilation 
of these two concepts – a loss frame and a prevention focus (see Zou et al., 2014) – 
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provides comfort in conceptualizing these two concepts as equivalent when viewing this 
and past inoculation research.  For the sake of clarity the loss frame employed in this 
study and the negative outcome focus used by Mason and Miller (2011) will henceforth 
be referred to as prevention focus. 
To help make sense of the results of the current investigation it is important to 
review past work that has concerned RFT.  In 2011 Mason and Miller examined whether 
or not emphasizing a prevention focus would strengthen resistance.  Furthermore they 
argued that cognitive (as opposed to affective) language in the inoculation message 
should enhance the prevention focus effect.  While they found strong support for the 
impact of prevention focus on generated resistance, they found that using cognitive 
language boosted counterarguing but not threat or overall resistance.  Pfau and colleagues 
(2000) also examined the use of cognitive and affective language in inoculation 
treatments though they did not explicitly address prevention focus.  Contrary to their 
hypotheses cognitive language did not boost resistance, threat, or counterarguing as 
compared with affective content.  However the findings of Pfau and colleagues (2000) 
did point to the ability of anger elicitation to boost threat levels, a finding that was later 
confirmed by Miller, Ivanov, and colleagues (2013). 
Another inoculation study is relevant to the present discussion of possible RFT 
impacts.  In 2009 Pfau and colleagues extended seminal work on inoculation and affect 
(2001) and compared anger-affective (negative) and happy-affective (positive) messages.  
Based on Lazarus’ appraisal theory (1991) – which offers that goal attainment or 
obstruction is key to elicited affect – they hypothesized that anger-affective messages 
should generate greater resistance than the happy-affective messages.  What is most 
  85 
considerable to the current study, however, is the way in which Pfau and colleagues 
(2009) conceptualized their messages.  Negative messages were embedded with language 
indicating that goal attainment would be thwarted while positive messages were designed 
to facilitate goal attainment.  Pfau and colleagues (2009) found that the negative 
messages generated greater resistance.  Given that the researchers focused on goal 
attainment or obstruction, the parallel with prevention or promotion focus – a concept 
that has been more thoroughly developed since 2009 – seems clear. 
The findings in this study advance the suggestion that RFT can strengthen 
generated resistance, in addition to providing several avenues for additional research.  
When considered in tandem with the Mason and Miller (2011) and Pfau and colleagues 
(2009) findings, the value of emphasizing loss avoidance over potential gains in 
inoculation message construction is clear.  The prevention focus message in this study 
prevented belief slippage significantly more than the promotion focus (i.e., gain frame) 
message.  The cumulative results of this study, Mason and Miller (2011), and Pfau and 
colleagues (2009) should encourage both practitioners and scholars to incorporate a 
prevention focus into inoculation efforts.  Furthermore the findings of this study are in 
line with numerous bodies of research that have found the value in emphasizing losses 
over gains (see Rick, 2010).   
As a burgeoning area of study, these results also generate many questions about 
other potential effects of prevention focus on the inoculation process.  Namely, would an 
attack message employing a prevention focus overwhelm protection created by a 
promotion focus inoculation message?  Would a supportive message that used a 
prevention focus rival protection created by a promotion focus inoculation message?  
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Previous research (Ivanov et al., 2009b; 2012) has found a matching effect with regard to 
affect and inoculation.  Specifically, when a person with an affective emotional base is 
presented with an affect-based inoculation message the generated resistance is stronger.  
Would a similar matching scenario occur if – when considering RFT as a trait variable – 
a prevention focused individual were presented with a prevention focused inoculation 
message?   
The fact that RFT considers regulatory focus as both a state and trait variable 
(Zou et al., 2014)  is worth mentioning when considering RFT and inoculation in tandem.  
Inoculation research is largely conducted in multiple phases with a treatment phase 
followed in about two weeks with an attack phase (Banas & Rains, 2010). What does this 
time lag do for the prevention/promotion focus priming process?  Is the lag of two weeks 
(which is considered optimal for letting inoculation treatments process) so long that state 
prevention focus effects are nil, leaving only trait effects? If so are there benefits to 
resistance as a whole in sacrificing inoculation processing time for a stronger regulatory 
focus prime?  If state RFT effects are depleted by the time between inoculation study 
phases then trait regulatory focus needs to be considered a covariate since this and 
previous investigations have shown effects for regulatory focus.  Future research needs to 
address the many questions that arise when trying to balance a regulatory focus prime 
with optimal time frames for inoculation treatments. 
Findings from this and previous investigations also call for a more nuanced look 
at exactly how the prevention focus message should be structured.  Specifically, this 
study posits that attempts should be made to boost belief certainty and threat and that a 
closer look should be taken at counterarguing.  In this study the prevention focus 
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inoculation message did not demonstrate higher belief certainty than the promotion focus 
inoculation message.  An increase in belief certainty should strengthen generated 
resistance; therefore attempts should be made to engineer a prevention focused 
inoculation message that also increases belief certainty.  The findings from this study 
regarding PIT might hold the key.  In the current study the PIT message that enhanced 
certainty was simply the prevention focused inoculation message with a sentence 
encouraging PIT added at the end.  Thus the findings from this investigation suggest a 
very simple solution to the problem of lack of belief certainty with use of a prevention 
focused inoculation message – ask participants to PIT. 
Another intriguing potential enhancement to a prevention focused inoculation 
message, as suggested earlier in this study, is integration of anger elicitation.  After all, 
Pfau and colleagues (2000) studied message framing, a very similar concept to RFT, and 
found that anger could boost threat.  Could it be that this study provides a missing link to 
cumulative study results and a trifecta of inoculation success exists?  Could a prevention 
focused inoculation message enhanced with anger elicitation (for threat) and PIT 
instructions (for certainty) exceed the current generated resistance ceiling?  Future work 
that combines prevention/promotion focus, anger elicitation, and PIT is needed to 
ascertain the effect of this combination on generated resistance. 
While the suggestion to integrate these three elements is certainly intriguing, the 
next logical question is:  What about counterarguing?  As a long-standing consideration 
in inoculation research, trying to boost multiple elements of the process without also 
boosting counterarguing seems amiss. However, the findings of Pfau and colleagues 
(2009) suggest that counterarguing could increase as a side benefit of employing a 
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prevention focus.  In their study the negative, or anger-affective messages resulted in 
higher counterarguing output. Similarly, in the other inoculation study most closely 
related to this investigation’s focus on RFT (Mason & Miller, 2011), the investigators 
found that a prevention focused message could boost counterarguing.  When considering 
the work of Mason and Miller (2011) and Pfau and colleagues (2009) it does not appear 
that counterarguing output has to be sacrificed to use a prevention focused inoculation 
message enhanced with anger and a suggestion to PIT.   
Finally, there are also contextual questions raised by this research that should be 
addressed in future studies.  Could the positive results for prevention focused messages 
replicate outside the context of financial investing?  The context of this study lent itself to 
easy manipulation of gain and loss language. However, could gain and loss language also 
be applied for strengthening of generated resistance in other areas of inoculation 
research?  For example, could inoculation campaigns in the health communication 
context (see Ivanov, 2011) be strengthened by emphasizing the consequences of 
unhealthy behavior as opposed to the benefits of healthy behavior, similar to previous 
work (Mason & Miller, 2011)?  Or could an inoculation message designed to prevent 
risky behavior in adolescents (see Parker et al., 2012) benefit from illustrating potential 
losses such as sexual health and reputation damage?  And, most relevant to this study, 
could an organization using inoculation messages as a preemptive crisis communication 
strategy emphasize the consequence of a lost business relationship between itself and its 
stakeholders as a way to strengthen beliefs during forthcoming crises?  These questions 
can serve as a solid starting point for future research concerning inoculation and RFT. 
                                                                                                                                     
Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the results of this study advance both the research opportunities 
and applied potential of inoculation theory.  The findings that inoculation can function in 
crisis situations, that inoculation messages will not harm beliefs in the absence of a crisis, 
and that protection generated by inoculation treatments can resist persuasive attacks 
presented through video boost the practical utility of the theory.  Additionally, this study 
has illustrated the potential for inoculation messages to be used by organizations as a 
preemptive crisis communication strategy.  This potential is especially potent for 
financial institutions that need a way to protect SIM beliefs prior to periods of market 
turbulence.   
The validity of past inoculation studies that have found inoculation to be a 
superior strategy to a supportive-only one and that have used print messages is also 
supported by this study.  This consistency with past inoculation research strengthens 
inoculation research as a whole and helps lay a more solid foundation for crisis 
communication as a burgeoning area of inoculation scholarship.  Ancillary findings 
concerning PIT and loss frame inoculation messages are also intriguing and beg for more 
study.  Though some of the results in this investigation were not as predicted, the value of 
this work to the overall body of inoculation research and to the practice of crisis 
communication should not be diminished. 
 
 
 
Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014 
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APPENDIX A: 
Sample Questionnaire 
 A sample questionnaire containing all three phases of this study can be found on 
the following pages.  The questionnaire provided in this appendix contains the 
inoculation (loss frame) treatment message in phase two and the print attack in phase 
three.  The questionnaire for the participants not in these groups differed only in the 
treatment message received in phase two (or lack thereof in the case of the control group) 
and the attack message received in phase three (or lack thereof for the no crisis group).  
The questionnaire included in this appendix has been modified from the online format 
presented to participants via Qualtrics survey software.  As such, this document mirrors 
the actual survey format as closely as possible.  Section titles (e.g., “welcome”, 
“consent”, “demographics”) were also added to this document to facilitate transfer of the 
information from an online format. 
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PHASE ONE 
Welcome: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on investing. 
 
The data for this study will be collected through three phases, or three separate online 
surveys. The total amount of time expected to complete the study is 45 minutes to an 
hour, or 15 to 20 minutes per phase.  
 
You are about to complete Phase 1, which is the first of three phases.  In two weeks you 
will be given access to Phase 2.  Two weeks after completing Phase 2 you will be 
emailed a link that provides you with access to Phase 3. Once you have completed Phase 
3 you are done with the study.  
 
Thank you again for helping me understand how investors react to bad news.  The part 
you have agreed to play in this research is very important. 
 
Lindsay L. Dillingham 
 
Consent: 
 
Consent to Participate in Research Study 
 
You are receiving access to this study, titled “Using inoculation messages to protect ‘stay 
in the market’ beliefs during financial crises” because you selected it from the list of 
available studies in the COM research participation system. 
 
There is no guarantee you will get any direct benefit from this research.  However, your 
responses may help us understand more about the way investors react to bad news about 
the financial markets.  
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We hope to receive completed questionnaires from about 350 people, so your answers are 
important to us.  Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the 
survey/questionnaire, but if you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or 
discontinue at any time.  
 
The data for this study will be collected through three phases, or three separate online 
surveys. The total amount of time expected to complete the study is 45 minutes to an 
hour, or 15 to 20 minutes per phase.  After signing up for this study, you will emailed a 
link.  This link will take you to an online survey management tool that will allow you to 
complete phase one. Phase one will consist of reading a message and then completing 
questionnaires about your views.  Two weeks after completing phase one you will be 
emailed a link for phase two. In this phase you will read a message (different than the one 
in phase one) and then complete questionnaires about your views.  In some cases you will 
be completing questionnaires about your views without first reading a message.  Two 
weeks after completing phase two window you will be emailed a link for phase three.  
Phase three consists of either watching a short video clip or reading a message and then 
completing questionnaires about your views.  Completion of phase three means you have 
completed the study. 
 
You will receive one research credit for completing the survey/questionnaire. If you do 
not want to participate, there are alternatives to earning this credit. See you course 
syllabus or instructor for more information.  To successfully earn one research credit all 
three phases must be completed.  Failure to complete all three phases will result in no 
research credit awarded for participation. 
 
There are no known risks to participating in this study. 
 
We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.  
However, we may be required to show information which identifies you to people who 
need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these would be people from such 
organizations as the University of Kentucky.  Please be aware, while we make every 
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effort to safeguard your data once received from the online survey/data gathering 
company, given the nature of online surveys, as with anything involving the Internet, we 
can never guarantee the confidentiality of the data while still on the survey/data gathering 
company’s servers, or while en route to either them or us. It is also possible the raw data 
collected for research purposes may be used for marketing or reporting purposes by the 
survey/data gathering company after the research is concluded, depending on the 
company’s Terms of Service and Privacy policies. 
 
If you have questions about the study, please feel free to ask me or my faculty advisor; 
our contact information is given below.  If you have complaints, suggestions, or questions 
about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the University of Kentucky 
Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll-free at 1-866-400-9428. 
 
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.    
 
Sincerely, 
 
Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu 
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu 
 
College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky 
 
Clicking on the "I agree" button will indicate your agreement to participate and send you 
to the survey site.  
 
If you choose not to participate please click "I decline" and you will be taken to the 
survey exit. 
 
 I agree 
 I decline 
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Age: 
What is your age? 
 17 or younger 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
 28 
 29 
 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
 34 
 35 
 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
 40+ 
 
Demographics: 
Gender: 
 Male 
 Female 
 
What is your ethnic background? 
 White/Caucasian 
 African American 
 Hispanic 
 Asian 
 Native American 
 Pacific Islander 
 Other (please specify) 
 
 
Lead-in: 
You are about to begin the study.  Please read each page carefully.  You will be provided 
with a message and then be asked to answer questions about your reactions.  Please think 
through each answer you provide.  If you are ready to proceed please click on the arrow 
below to continue. 
Belief creation: 
Do you think you will ever invest money in the stock market, either through an 
employer’s retirement plan or a through a private investment?  If so do you know what 
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your goals should be?  After all, investing without goals can have serious financial 
consequences! 
 
Typically the goals for investing are simple:  buy and hold or buy low and sell high.  The 
logic behind each of these tried and true investment strategies is very basic.  Let’s review 
each one separately. 
 
Buy and hold: 
Historical market data shows that over time the overall value of stocks has risen 
tremendously.  Looking at market movement on a chart shows that, even though the stock 
market sometimes goes down, buying and holding stocks for the long term is a good way 
to make money.  Eventually investors can sell stock when it reaches a high point.  So, a 
buy and hold strategy is used when investors commit to holding a stock for a minimum 
period of time and then sell the stock at some point after the minimum time commitment 
but when the value is high. 
 
Buy low and sell high: 
Some investors prefer a more active strategy.  Buy and hold investors might commit to 
holding a stock for ten years!  Those who want a more active strategy can opt for an 
alternative strategy – buy low and sell high.  This strategy requires investors to watch 
periodic changes in stock values.  Investors will purchase stock when the value is down 
and then sell the same stock for more money when the price of the stock goes up.  Even 
though this requires a more watchful eye on the part of the investor, money can be made 
using this strategy. 
 
Regardless of which strategy investors prefer – buy and hold or buy low and sell high – 
there is one important thing to remember.  The time to sell stocks is not when the market 
is down!  To be a successful investor one must never sell stock during a down market.  
Both a buy and hold and buy low and sell high strategy require only selling stock when 
the market is up.  
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Remember these simple principles for investing success! 
 
Belief scale: 
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on 
your overall perceptions. 
 
People should sell their stock when the market is down. 
Disagree     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No      Yes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
False      True 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wrong      Right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incorrect     Correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Certainty measure: 
How certain do you feel towards the statement below?  Zero indicates “no certainty” and 
100 indicates “absolutely certain”. 
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
 __________________________ 
 
Involvement scale: 
How relevant to you is the topic of selling stocks when the market is down? 
Unimportant     Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Irrelevant     Relevant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nonessential     Essential 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Of no concern to me    Of concern to me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does not matter to me    Matters to me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Useless     Useful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trivial      Fundamental 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Risk scale: 
Please carefully consider the statements below and answer based on your usual behavior.  
 
Although a new thing has a high promise of reward, I do not want to be the first one who 
tries it. 
 Extremely like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Unlike me  
 Like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Extremely like me 
 
I would rather wait until it has been tested and proven before I try it. 
 Extremely like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Unlike me  
 Like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Extremely like me 
 
When I have to make a decision for which the consequence is not clear, I like to go with 
the safer option although it may yield limited rewards. 
 Extremely like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Unlike me  
 Like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Extremely like me 
 
I like to try new things, knowing well that some of them will disappoint me. 
 Extremely like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Unlike me  
 Like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Extremely like me 
 
To earn greater rewards, I am willing to take higher risks. 
 Extremely like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Unlike me  
 Like me  
 Somewhat like me  
 Extremely like me 
Investing experience: 
Please rate your level of experience with investing in the stock market. 
No experience     A lot of experience 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Lead-in: 
The next few questions ask you consider times you have come into contact with 
viewpoints that are unlike your own. Think of how you reacted in those situations. Then, 
please choose the answer choice that most closely reflects how much each statement 
describes you. 
 
Personal information: 
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study: 
Last name:   __________________________ 
First name:   __________________________ 
*University email address* __________________________ 
Student ID   __________________________ 
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PHASE TWO 
 
Welcome: 
Welcome back to this study on investing.  You are now entering the second of three 
phases. Please remember that it is very important to carefully read each page and 
consider your answers. 
  
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.    
 
Sincerely, 
Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu 
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu 
 
College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky 
 
Lead-in: 
This section of the survey contains a message about an issue, which is followed by 
exercises and scales concerning the message.  Therefore it is extremely important that 
you read the message carefully since some of the questions pertain to the message you 
have just read. 
 
Treatment message: 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock market 
requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  Both of 
these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of these 
disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell 
stock when the market is down.  However, despite these simple financial principles, in 
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling 
stock at a loss more than ever before.  In fact, people like you who feel confident in their 
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock 
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at some of the lowest points in history.  Often these sales occur after investors have seen 
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will 
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down 
markets despite frightening news stories?  How about when you may feel that all your 
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings?  Even if you believe 
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every 
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as 
prepared as you think you are. 
 
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is that they 
can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets.  In one recent interview, an 
investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go down 
every day…it troubles me.  I feel I have to get out while I can.” 
  
While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined 
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay 
compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns.  For 
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would 
have only received $600!  However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market 
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more striking, $1,000 invested 
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of 
stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can 
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur.  Ignoring 
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of 
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason. 
 
Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling after 
several days of downward movement will prevent further losses.  Even though no one 
can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually increase 
their total market losses.  Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down market 
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occurs during the first signs of upswing.  Therefore, investors who sell to prevent further 
losses actually miss the chance to recover their money. 
 
Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial consequences 
make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when the market is 
down!  Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the false logic that 
you can prevent further losses.  It just makes sense for your financial future! 
 
Belief scale: 
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on 
your overall perceptions. 
 
People should sell their stock when the market is down. 
Disagree     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No      Yes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
False      True 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wrong      Right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incorrect     Correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Certainty measure: 
How certain do you feel towards the statement below?  Zero indicates “no certainty” and 
100 indicates “absolutely certain”. 
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
 __________________________ 
.  
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Threat Scale: 
I find the possibility of being persuaded to sell stock during a down market to be:  
Nonthreatening    Threatening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unintimidating    Intimidating 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not harmful     Harmful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dangerous     Safe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Risky     Risky 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Personal information: 
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study: 
Last name:   __________________________ 
First name:   __________________________ 
*University email address* __________________________ 
Student ID   __________________________ 
.  
.  
.  
.  
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PHASE THREE 
 
Welcome: 
Welcome back to this study on investing.  You are now entering the last of three phases. 
Please remember that it is very important to carefully view each page and consider your 
answers. 
   
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.    
 
Sincerely, 
Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu 
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu 
 
College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky 
 
Lead-in: 
This section of the survey contains a message about an issue, which is followed by 
exercises and scales concerning the message.  Therefore, it is extremely important that 
you read the message carefully since some of the questions pertain to the message you 
have just read. 
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Print crisis message: 
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Belief scale: 
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on 
your overall perceptions. 
 
People should sell their stock when the market is down. 
Disagree     Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No      Yes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
False      True 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wrong      Right 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incorrect     Correct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Certainty measure: 
How certain do you feel towards the statement below?  Zero indicates “no certainty” and 
100 indicates “absolutely certain”. 
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
 __________________________ 
 
Counterarguing: 
The next section of the survey asks you to recall your thoughts and feelings while you 
read the previous message.  Once you have provided an argument, please proceed to 
columns two and three and answer the relevant questions about that argument.  Then 
please proceed to describing the next argument. 
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Check off ONLY arguments that 
you thought of about the issue of 
selling stock when the market is 
down. 
 
How strong do you think or feel the 
arguments you checked off 
are?  Please do not provide a 
rating for arguments you did 
not check off in the previous 
column. 
Investments should be sold 
during a market downturn to 
prevent further loss. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Investments should be held 
during a market downturn to 
benefit from future upswings. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Selling investments during a 
market downturn should only 
be done if you must have the 
money. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Selling investments during a 
market downturn is a good 
way to keep your money safe. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Making money from 
investments requires enduring 
uncertainty when the market 
goes down. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Investors should not have to 
worry that they are losing 
money, so they should sell 
their securities when the value 
goes down. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
No matter how bad the 
market gets, investors should 
stay strong and wait to 
recover their losses. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
If an investor needs to sell 
their investments while the 
market is down, they should 
try their best to get the money 
somewhere else or wait until 
the market goes back up. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Investors should purchase 
investments with the attitude 
that holdings should be sold if 
a bad market makes them 
nervous. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Investors should purchase 
investments expecting ups 
and downs but feeling 
committed to not selling them 
during a down market. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
If an investor gets uneasy 
about lost value of their 
investments, he or she should 
sell no matter which way the 
market is moving. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
An investor should sell 
investments if he or she feels 
uncomfortable, regardless of 
whether the value is up or 
down. 
_____ 
Incorrect   Correct 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
 
Personal information: 
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study: 
Last name:   __________________________ 
First name:   __________________________ 
*University email address* __________________________ 
Student ID   __________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: 
Treatment Messages 
 As explained in the methods section of this investigation, five treatment messages 
were used.  Four of the treatment messages were slightly varied inoculation messages 
(inoculation loss frame, inoculation gain frame, PIT, no PIT) and one supportive message 
was used.  The five treatment messages randomly assigned to participants and used in 
phase two of this study are presented in the proceeding pages. 
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INOCULATION: LOSS FRAME 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock 
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of 
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell 
stock when the market is down.  However, despite these simple financial principles, in 
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling 
stock at a loss more than ever before.  In fact, people like you who feel confident in their 
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock 
at some of the lowest points in history.  Often these sales occur after investors have seen 
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will 
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down 
markets despite frightening news stories?  How about when you may feel that all your 
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings?  Even if you believe 
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every 
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as 
prepared as you think you are. 
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is 
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets.  In one recent interview, 
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go 
down every day…it troubles me.  I feel I have to get out while I can.” 
  While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined 
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay 
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns.  For 
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would 
have only received $600!  However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market 
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more striking, $1,000 invested 
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of 
stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can 
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur.  Ignoring 
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of 
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason. 
  Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling 
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses.  Even though no 
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually 
increase their total market losses.  Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down 
market occurs during the first signs of upswing.  Therefore, investors who sell to prevent 
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money. 
  Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial 
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when 
the market is down!  Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the 
false logic that you can prevent further losses.  It just makes sense for your financial 
future! 
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INOCULATION: GAIN FRAME 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock 
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of 
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell 
stock when the market is down.  However, despite these simple financial principles, in 
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and missing the 
chance to profit from stock more than ever before.  In fact, people like you who feel 
confident in their ability to withstand down markets are avoiding potential gains by 
selling their stock at some of the lowest points in history.  Often these sales occur after 
investors have seen news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that no 
money can be made in the stock market…Are you prepared to hold your current or future 
investments through down markets despite frightening news stories?  How about when 
you may feel that all your hard work is for nothing and you really might not make any 
money?  Even if you believe you could think logically while watching the value of your 
investments decrease every day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate 
that you may not be as prepared as you think you are. 
  One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is 
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets.  In one recent interview, 
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go 
down every day…it troubles me.  I feel I have to get out while I can.” 
  While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined 
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay 
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for the money that can be made by withstanding the emotional pull of market downturns.  
Consider this – even though the markets have been very turbulent since 2008, $1,000 
invested in the stock market in 2006 would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more 
striking, $1,000 invested in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two 
decades the overall value of stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy-and-hold 
investment strategy can offer amazing returns even though ups and downs in the stock 
market inevitably occur.  Ignoring tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary 
discomfort is an unfortunate example of investors who miss major financial gains for no 
good reason. 
  Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling 
after several days of downward movement they feel no gains are possible.  Even though 
no one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it can’t 
make money during the market upswings.  Research has shown that the biggest jump 
after a down market occurs during the first signs of upswing.  Therefore, investors who 
sell to prevent further losses could instead choose to recover their money and build 
wealth over the long term. 
  Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial 
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when 
the market is down!  Loads of market data shows that waiting through uncertainty can 
help you make money.  It just makes sense for your financial future! 
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INOCULATION: PIT 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock 
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of 
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell 
stock when the market is down.  However, despite these simple financial principles, in 
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling 
stock at a loss more than ever before.  In fact, people like you who feel confident in their 
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock 
at some of the lowest points in history.  Often these sales occur after investors have seen 
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will 
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down 
markets despite frightening news stories?  How about when you may feel that all your 
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings?  Even if you believe 
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every 
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as 
prepared as you think you are. 
  One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is 
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets.  In one recent interview, 
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go 
down every day…it troubles me.  I feel I have to get out while I can.” 
  While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined 
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay 
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns.  For 
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would 
have only received $600!  However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market 
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more striking, $1,000 invested 
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of 
stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can 
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur.  Ignoring 
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of 
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason. 
  Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling 
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses.  Even though no 
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually 
increase their total market losses.  Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down 
market occurs during the first signs of upswing.  Therefore, investors who sell to prevent 
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money. 
  Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial 
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when 
the market is down!  Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the 
false logic that you can prevent further losses.  It just makes sense for your financial 
future! 
  After reading this message, please talk to as many fellow investors as you can 
about the importance of staying in the market during downturns. 
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INOCULATION: NO PIT 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock 
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of 
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell 
stock when the market is down.  However, despite these simple financial principles, in 
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling 
stock at a loss more than ever before.  In fact, people like you who feel confident in their 
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock 
at some of the lowest points in history.  Often these sales occur after investors have seen 
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will 
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down 
markets despite frightening news stories?  How about when you may feel that all your 
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings?  Even if you believe 
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every 
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as 
prepared as you think you are. 
  One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is 
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets.  In one recent interview, 
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go 
down every day…it troubles me.  I feel I have to get out while I can.” 
  While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined 
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay 
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns.  For 
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would 
have only received $600!  However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market 
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more striking, $1,000 invested 
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of 
stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can 
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur.  Ignoring 
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of 
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason. 
  Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling 
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses.  Even though no 
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually 
increase their total market losses.  Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down 
market occurs during the first signs of upswing.  Therefore, investors who sell to prevent 
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money. 
  Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial 
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when 
the market is down!  Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the 
false logic that you can prevent further losses.  It just makes sense for your financial 
future! 
  After reading this message, please do not talk to anyone about the importance of 
staying in the market during downturns. 
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SUPPORTIVE 
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock 
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.  
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down.  Either of 
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by 
understanding market fluctuation and only selling when the market is high or the value or 
their stocks has increased.  Understanding these simple financial principles has allowed 
many investors to maximize their returns.  Following the basic rules of buy low and sell 
high or buy and hold can have major positive outcomes for investors and potential 
investors. 
  You can be one of the investors who makes a great deal of money on your 
portfolio if you heed simple investing guidelines.  Remember, the goal for investors is to 
buy and hold or buy low and sell high.  Historical market information shows the clear 
benefit of these plans for investors and potential investors.  For example, $1,000 invested 
in 2006 would be worth at least $2,250 today!  Even more striking, $1,000 invested in the 
year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of 
stocks has risen over 200%.  As you can see, a buy and hold or buy low and sell high 
investment strategy can boost your performance even though ups and downs in the 
market will inevitably happen over time.  By maintaining the tried-and-true investment 
strategies of buy and hold or buy low and sell high you can improve your overall 
financial health.  You can make sure that all of your hard work and savings pays off and 
you are able to make money on your current or future investments.  
  Another reason for not selling stocks when the market is down is that you can 
avoid transaction fees.  Consider this – If you ever have money in the stock market you 
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must pay a fee every time you want to buy or sell stock!  Paying these transaction fees 
can greatly reduce the funds you have to invest. If you sell stock when the market goes 
down you are losing money in two ways.  First, the value of the investment has decreased 
since you made the purchase.  For example, if you buy several shares of a stock at $20 
and then sell it after the value of the stock has fallen to $15 you have lost $5 per share.  
The second way you will lose money if you sell stocks when the market is down is by 
paying the transaction fee.  In addition to the $5 per share you have already lost you will 
have to pay a certain amount per share for selling the stock.  By losing money in both of 
these ways – the decrease in the stock value and the transaction fees – you can hurt your 
current or future financial well-being. So, don’t sell stocks when the market is down.  
  Loads of market data shows that holding onto stocks just makes sense for your 
financial future!  Over time you can make money and feel confident that you’ve made 
sound decisions.  Remember that it is wise to avoid selling the stocks you have already 
purchased.  You can be a successful investor or potential investor by considering simple 
investing ideas.  The choice is yours; only you have the ability to avoid selling your 
stocks when the market goes down! 
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APPENDIX C: 
Attack Messages 
 Two attack messages were used in this study.  One attack message was presented 
in video and the other was presented in print.  The video message was edited to the 
desired content and then the print attack message was designed to mirror the content of 
the video message as closely as possible. The print attack message is presented in this 
appendix.  Since the video attack message could not be inserted into this document 
directions for understanding the content of the message are provided in this document.  A 
transcript with editing cues from the original video is provided in the pages to follow. 
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PRINT ATTACK MESSAGE 
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VIDEO ATTACK MESSAGE TRANSCRIPT 
Section 1: 
Anchor:  Traders seemed to be in a rush to get to work despite the carnage but the Wall 
Street bull – once again – was going nowhere. 
Anchor:  Alan Valdez has seen the stock market go in one direction, down, for months. 
Valdez:  The whole industry is in flux now.  Everybody is worried about the financials. 
Anchor:  It would be a bad opening. 
Vadlez:  All my indications right now are all on the sell side. 
Reporter:  Everybody wants to sell? 
Vadlez:  Yes.  Right now everything I got is on the sell side. 
Anchor:  Even the pros like Valdez are shocked by what’s happened. 
Valdez:  I’ve never seen markets like this.  Things are really monumental down here.  
They’re…really historical what’s going on down here. 
Section 2: 
Anchor:  Right now, breaking news here.  Stocks all around the world are tanking 
because of the crisis on Wall Street.  Pauline Chu is in for Jennifer this morning.  I can’t 
imagine how jittery the nerves must be on Wall Street for that open. 
Chu:  Well I can tell you already that the Dow is expected to open down 300 points this 
morning, Robin.  So that gives you an indication of how jittery the markets are.  This is 
such a blow to investors. 
Section 3: 
Anchor:  Ali Velshi, let me start with you.  What the hell is going on? 
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Velshi:  It was basically the sense that we are so uncertain about where the global 
economy is going that people just decided to, to take their, their money out and basically, 
uh, do the equivalent – the global equivalent – of taking your money and stuffing it in a 
mattress.  Everybody just wanted to pull out and say “I don’t want to go into tomorrow 
where this unemployment number is coming out in the morning not knowing what’s 
happening, not able to get out of my positions.”  They did it ahead of time; it just 
compounded on itself.  Fear took over.  And, uh, people started selling their stocks uh, in, 
in this mass momentum move. 
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